Changing the social norm of tax compliance by voting

Kyklos

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 141-171

  Alm, James ^a   McClelland, Gary H ^a   Schulze, William D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

TAX SYSTEM; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0032808476     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1999.tb01440.x     Document Type: Article

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