Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: A report on the Swiss experience

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 287-306

  Feld, Lars P ^a   Kirchgässner, Gebhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Direct democracy; H10; H30; Public debt; Public expenditures

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000994943     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00003-3     Document Type: Article

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