Information management in incentive problems

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 105, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 796-821

  Lewis, Tracy R ^a   Sappington, David E M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007240633     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/262094     Document Type: Article

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