A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 17-39

  Araujo, Aloisio ^a,b   Moreira, Humberto ^c  

^a IMPA   (Brazil)

^b FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS   (Brazil)

^c PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

D82; First order approach; Lagrangian; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042409398     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00055-0     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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