On the value of commitment with asymmetric information

Econometrica

Volumn 64, Issue 6, 1996, Pages 1395-1414

  Rey, Patrick ^a   Salanié, Bernard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Commitment; Renegotiation; Short term contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000345147     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171836     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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