First-order approach to principal-agent problems: A generalization

GENEVA Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 59-65

  Alvi, Eskander ^a  

^a WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Action risk interactions; First order approach; Nonseparable utility; Principal agent contracts; Wage action interactions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346039644     PISSN: 09264957     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008663531322     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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