Contract complexity, incentives, and the value of delegation

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 257-289

  Melumad, Nahum ^a   Mookherjee, Dilip ^b   Reichelstein, Stefan ^c,d  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040238769     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864097567101     Document Type: Article

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