Auditing without commitment

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 629-640

  Khalil, Fahad ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031329168     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555779     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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