Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 33-65

  Lael Brainard, S ^a   Martimort, David ^b,c  

^a Old Executives Office ^*  (United States)

^b CEMAGREF   (France)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Strategic trade policy

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; STRATEGIC POLICY; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0031425222     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-1996(96)01446-8     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Bagwell, K., 1995, Commitment and observability in games, Game and Economic Behavior 8, 271-280.
2. Baldwin, R. and P.R. Krugman, 1988, Market access and international competition: A simulation study of 16K random access memories, in: R. Feenstra, ed., Empirical methods for international trade (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
3. Baron, D. and R. Myerson, 1982, Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs, Econometrica 50, 911-930.
4. Bovard, J., 1991, The fair trade fraud (St. Martin's, New York).
5. Brainard, S.L., 1994, Last one out wins: Trade policy in an international exit game, International Economic Review 35, 151-172.
6. Brainard, S.L. and D. Martimort, 1996, Strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts, Review of Economic Studies 214, 81-106.
7. Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer, 1985, Export subsidies and international market share rivalry, Journal of International Economics 18, 83-100.
8. Caillaud, B., R. Guesnerie, P. Rey and J. Tirole, 1985, The normative economics of government intervention in production in the light of incentive theory: A review of recent contributions, Rand Journal of Economics 19, 1-26.
9. Caillaud, B., B. Jullien and P. Picard, 1995, Competing vertical structures: Precommitment and renegotiation, Econometrica 63, 621-647.
10. Carliner, G., 1986, Industrial policy for emerging industries, in: P. Krugman, ed., Strategic trade policy and the new international economics (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
11. Carmichael, C.M., 1987, The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences, Journal of International Economics 23, 1-19.
12. de Meza, D., 1986, Export subsidies and high productivity: Cause or effect?, Canadian Journal of Economics 19, 347-350.
13. Dixit, A.K., 1988, Optimal trade and industrial policy for the US automobile industry, in: R. Feenstra, ed., Empirical methods for international trade (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
14. Dixit, A.K. and G.M. Grossman, 1986, Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries, Journal of International Economics 21, November.
15. Eaton, J. and G.M. Grossman, 1986, Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics 51, 383.
16. Faggart, M.C., 1991, Concurrence, asymétrie d'information, théorie des incitations: Quelques développements du modèle principal agent, Mimeo. (Cepremap, Paris).
17. Feenstra, R.C. and T.R. Lewis, 1991, Negotiated trade restrictions with private political pressure, Quarterly Journal of Economics 56, 1287-1307.
18. Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, 1989, Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player, Econometrica 57, 755-778.
19. Gal-Or, E., 1988, Vertical separation in oligopolistic markets with incomplete information, Working Paper (University of Pittsburgh).
20. Gresik, T.A. and D.R. Nelson, 1991, Incentive compatible regulation of a foreign-owned subsidiary, Mimeo.
21. Grossman, G.M., 1986, Strategic export promotion: A critique, in: P.R. Krugman, ed., Strategic trade policy and the new international economics (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.) 47-68.
22. Gruenspecht, H.K., 1988, Export subsidies for differentiated products, Journal of International Economics 24, 331-344.
23. Jullien, B., 1995, Participation constraints in adverse selection models, Mimeo. (Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle, Paris).
24. Katz, M., 1991, Game playing agents: Unobservable contracts as precommitments, Rand Journal of Economics 22, 307-327.
25. Krugman, P.R. and S.L. Brainard, 1988, Problems in modelling competition in the international aircraft industry, Mimeo. (MIT).
26. Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1986, Using cost observation to regulate firms, Journal of Political Economy 94, 614-641.
27. Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A theory of incentives in regulation and procurement (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
28. Lewis, T. and D. Sappington, 1989, Countervailing incentives in agency problems, Journal of Economic Theory 49, 294-313.
29. Maggi, G., 1992, Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information, Mimeo. (Stanford).
30. Martimort, D., 1996, Exclusive dealing, common agency, and multiprincipals incentive theory, Rand Journal of Economics 27, 1-31.
31. Myerson, R., 1982, Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics 10, 67-81.
32. Neary, J.P., 1991, Export subsidies and price competition, in: E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds., International trade and trade policy (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).
33. Prusa, T., 1990, An incentive-compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem, Journal of International Economics 28, 155-172.
34. Raff, H., 1991, Intrafirm exports and optimal host country commercial policy under asymmetric information, Working Paper 91-27 (Groupe de Recherche en Economie de l'Energie et des Ressources Naturelles, Université Lavai, Quebec).
35. Schmidt, K., 1993, Reputation and equilibrium characterization in repeated games of conflicting interest, Econometrica 61, 325-351.
36. Seierstad A. and K. Sydsaeter, 1987, Optimal control theory with economic applications (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
37. Tirole, J., 1988, The theory of industrial organisation (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.).