Contracting with wealth-constrained agents

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 743-767

  Lewis, Tracy R ^a   Sappington, David E M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347309239     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00082     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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