Contracting with imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The single agent case

Econometrica

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 1077-1098

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Strausz, Roland ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Contract theory; Limited commitment; Mechanism design; Revelation principle

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000610282     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00231     Document Type: Article

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