Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable

Econometrica

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 119-134

  Krasa, Stefan ^a   Villamil, Anne P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracts; Costly state verification; Debt; Enforcement; Limited commitment; Renegotiation; Stochastic monitoring; Time consistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000110106     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00095     Document Type: Article

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