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Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 145-164

Incentive auctions and information revelation

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EID: 0034410384     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2601033     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (17)

References (33)
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