Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 105, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 547-581

  Meyer, Margaret A ^a   Vickers, John ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000588724     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/262082     Document Type: Article

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