Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 181-202

  Bontems, Philippe ^a   Bourgeon, Jean Marc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Contract theory; D23; D82; L22; Output and input monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007191446     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00042-0     Document Type: Article

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