Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?

Econometrica

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 741-781

  Tirole, Jean ^a  

^a Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

Authority; Incomplete contracts; Transaction costs; Unforeseen contingencies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001752681     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00052     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. AGHION, P., AND P. BOLTON (1987): "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Renew, 77, 388-401.
2. _ (1992): "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473-493.
3. AGHION, P., M. DEWATRIPONT, AND P. REY (1994): "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, 62, 257-282.
4. AGHION, P., AND B. HERMALIN (1990): "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6, 381-409.
5. AGHION, P., AND J. TIROLE (1994): "On the Management of Innovation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1185-1209.
6. _ (1995): "Some Implications of Growth for Organizational Form and Ownership Structure," European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 39, 440-456.
7. _ (1997): "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, 105, 1-29.
8. ALCHIAN, A., AND H. DEMSETZ (1972): "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, 62, 777-795.
9. ALLEN, F., AND D. GALE (1994): Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
10. ANDERLINI, L., AND L. FELLI (1994): "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1085-1124.
11. ANTON, J., AND D. YAO (1994): "Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights," American Economic Review, 84, 190-209.
12. ARROW, K. (1975): "Vertical Integration and Communication," Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 173-183.
13. BAKER, G., R. GIBBONS, AND K. MURPHY (1992): "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1125-1156.
14. BARCA, F., AND L. FELLI (1992): "Fiduciary Duties, Ownership, and Control," Mimeo, Bank of Italy and LSE.
15. BARNARD, C. (1938): The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
16. BERNHEIM, D., AND M. WHINSTON (1998): "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, 88, 902-932.
17. BINMORE, K., A. RUBINSTEIN, AND A. WOLINSKY (1986): "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling," Rand Journal of Economics, 17, 176-188.
18. BULL, C. (1987): "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 147-159.
19. BURKART, M., D. GROMB, AND F. PANUNZI (1997): "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 693-728.
20. WEBER, M. (1968): Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press.
21. WILLIAMSON, O. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.
22. _ (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.