Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind"

Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind"

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-208

  Apperly, Ian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84911093450     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203833926     Document Type: Book

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