Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription

Cognition

Volumn 115, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 54-70

  Back, Elisa ^a   Apperly, Ian A ^b  

^a KINGSTON UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adult; Theory of mind; True and false belief

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COGNITION; CONTROLLED STUDY; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; INFERENCE; MALE; PERCEPTIVE DISCRIMINATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE; ATTENTION; COGNITION; CONCEPT FORMATION; CULTURE; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; PHOTIC STIMULATION; PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE; REACTION TIME; REALITY TESTING; SOCIAL PERCEPTION; THEORY OF MIND;

EID: 77249144406     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.11.008     Document Type: Article

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