Experimental economics: Rethinking the rules

Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Bardsley, Nicholas ^a   Cubitt, Robin ^a   Loomes, Graham ^a   Moffatt, Peter ^a   Starmer, Chris ^a   Sugden, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84884115997     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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