How communication links influence coalition bargaining: A laboratory investigation

Management Science

Volumn 49, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 583-598

  Bolton, Gary E ^a,b   Chatterjee, Kalyan ^c   McGinn, Kathleen L ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Coalition; Communication; Experimental economics; Game theory; Negotiation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; CONTRACTS; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

COALITION BARGAINING; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; NEGOTIATION;

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;

EID: 0037664877     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.5.583.15148     Document Type: Article

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