Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: A study of response times

Economic Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 523, 2007, Pages 1243-1259

  Rubinstein, Ariel ^a,b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; SPATIAL COGNITION; STUDENT;

EID: 34848875093     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x     Document Type: Article

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