The hot versus cold effect in a simple bargaining experiment

Experimental Economics

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 75-90

  Brosig, Jeannette ^a   Weimann, Joachim ^a   Yang, Chun Lei ^b  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Emotions; Punishment; Simple sequential bargaining games; Strategy method

Indexed keywords

EID: 3342910914     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1024204826499     Document Type: Article

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