Naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments: A case study of the winner's curse

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 528, 2008, Pages 822-843

  Harrison, Glenn W ^a   List, John A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; MARKET CONDITIONS; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 37349044869     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02144.x     Document Type: Article

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