Testing theories of fairness-Intentions matter

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 287-303

  Falk, Armin ^a,b   Fehr, Ernst ^c   Fischbacher, Urs ^c  

^a IZA   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Experiments; Fairness; Intentions; Moonlighting game; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849050497     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.001     Document Type: Article

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