Rationality in economics: Constructivist and ecological forms

Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-364

  Smith, Vernon L ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84925110160     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511754364     Document Type: Book

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