Theories of fairness and reciprocity: Evidence and economic applications

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, Volume 1

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 208-257

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Schmidt, Klaus M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84927955566     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511610240.008     Document Type: Chapter

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