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Volumn 69, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 1193-1235

Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study

Author keywords

Cognition; Experimental economics; Noncooperative games; Strategic sophistication

Indexed keywords


EID: 0001635606     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00239     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (551)

References (12)
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  • 9
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    • _ (1995): "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence, " Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218-254.
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  • 11
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    • Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure
    • VAN HUYCK, JOHN, RAY BATTALIO, AND RICHARD BEIL (1990): "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure, " American Economic Review, 80, 234-248.
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  • 12
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    • Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games
    • in press
    • VAN HUYCK, JOHN, JOHN WILDENTHAL, AND RAY BATTALIO (2001): "Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games, " Games and Economic Behavior, in press.
    • (2001) Games and Economic Behavior
    • Van Huyck, J.1    Wildenthal, J.2    Battalio, R.3


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.