Regulatory litigation in the european union: Does the U.S. class action have a new analogue?

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 899-971

  Strong, S I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874899625     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (232)

1. "There is no consensus in policy or academic circles as to what exactly is connoted by the term regulation." Colin Scott, Privatization and Regulatory Regimes, in Oxford Handbook of Public Policy 651, 653 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006). One classic definition states that regulation involves "sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are socially valued," although modern critics have expanded the scope of application to include regulatory activity undertaken by private actors and other decentralized entities. See id.
2. (citing Phillip Selznick, Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 363, 363 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985)).
3. See John S. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 344 (2010)
4. see also]. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2012).
5. Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 197, 201 (2004)
6. (reviewing A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER and GLOBAL AUTHORITY (2003)); see also Scott, supra note 1, at 652 (recognizing that "regulation occurs within 'regimes' characterized by diffuse populations and of actors and considerable diversity in the norms and mechanisms of control").
7. See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 412, 414-15 (2011)
8. R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European Governance, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 101, 102 (2006).
9. Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 96 (2011)
10. (quoting ANDREW P. MORISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009)).
11. However, not all class actions operate in a regulatory manner. See RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS 63, 63-66 (2004); see also infra Part III.B.I. Class actions are not the only type of regulatory litigation. See
12. Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 612-25 (2012) (discussing the role of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and state attorneys general as well as shareholder litigation, which is considered the weakest and "most controversial" of the various forms of regulatory litigation); Glover, supra note 2, at 1190-91 (discussing enforcement mechanisms in the Racketeer Influenced and Corporate Organizations (RICO) Act); Luff, supra note 8, at 113 (discussing both "top-down" and "bottom-up" regulatory legislation);
13. Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (2007) (discussing state attorneys general).
14. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 67 (2007) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Securities];
15. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 309-17 (2006) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Transnational];
16. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptional-ism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41-52 (2009).
17. These issues affect questions regarding international enforceability of a class action judgment as well as the initial certification of the class. E Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (2011)
18. Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 313-16 (2011).
19. These issues have led to a flood of commentary. See Deborah Hensler, How Economic Globalisation is Helping to Construct a Private Transnational Legal Order, in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LAW 249, 250-59 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Hensler, Future]
20. George A. Bermann, U.S. Class Actions and the "Global Class," 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 94 (2009) (discussing the potential for "interjurisdictional conflict" and the worry about whether U.S. class action judgments will be recognized and enforced abroad); Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 35 (discussing forum non conveniens);
21. Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 465 (2009)
22. John C.L. Dixon, the Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement, 46 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 134 (1997)
23. Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment in England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MOD. L. REV. 180, 181-82 (2012) [hereinafter Mulheron, Vivendi]; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 11-12;
24. Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 89 n.70 (2011) (discussing economic issues relating to global class actions)
25. Mark Stiggelbout, The Recognition in England and Wales of United States Judgments in Class Actions, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433 (2011).
26. See DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, OVERVIEW OF EXISTING COLLECTIVE REDRESS SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES 38 (2011) [hereinafter Directorate General], available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/ activities/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT24242EN.pdf (noting European Member States have adopted four general types of collective redress: "group and representative actions, test case procedures and procedures for skimming off profits"); see also
27. Filippo Valguarnera, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe's Difficult Journey to Class Action, 10 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 8-19 (2010).
28. See Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 OJ. (L 143) (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075: en:PDF; Directive 2005/29, of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 2005 O.J. (L 149) (EC), available at
29. http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2005-29-EC.pdf; Directive 2004/48, of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) (EC), available at
30. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:157:0045: 0086:en:PDF; Directive 2000/35, of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 June 2000 on Combating Late Payment in Commercial Transactions, 2000 O.J. (L 200) (EC), available at
31. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:200:0035: 0038:en:PDF; Directive 98/ 27, of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 1998 on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests, 1998 O.J. (L 166) (EC), available at
32. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:166:0051: 0055:EN:PDF; Directive 93/13, of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L95) (ECC), available at
33. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013: en:HTML;see also White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008); Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM (2008) 794 final (Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress]; European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on "Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress," P7-TA-PROV (2012) 0021, ¶ 10-14 [hereinafter Resolution], available at
34. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP// TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0021+0-DOC+XML+V0//EN;
35. Christopher Hodges, European Union Legislation, in THE ANNALS, supra note 15, at 78-85 [hereinafter Hodges, ANNALS].
36. See Resolution, supra note 20. The Resolution was adopted following a public consultation from the European Commission and an own initiative report from the European Parliament. See Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC (2011) 173 final (Feb. 4, 2011) (EC) [hereinafter Public Consultation], available at http://ec.europa.eu/ justice/news/consulting-public/0054/sec-2011-173-en.pdf; Committee on Legal Affairs Report, 12 January 2012, "Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress," 2011/2089 (INI) [hereinafter Lehne Report], available at
37. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.doPpubRef=//EP// NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-0012+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
38. See Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1386, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdfjsf?text=&docid=49758&pageIndex= 0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=l&cid=2389349
39. S.I. Strong, Backyard Advantage: New Rules Mean That U.S. Companies May Be Forced to Litigate Across the Pond, 28 LEGAL TIMES 43 (May 23, 2005) (noting a foreign defendant may be subject to the Brussels I Regulation if that party is one of several necessary defendants, where one of those defendants is domiciled in a European Member State). Notably, the revised version of the Brussels I Regulation contemplates other instances in which the Regulation can affect persons domiciled outside the European Union. See Brussels I Recast, supra note 25. For example: The recast regulation will provide that no national rules of jurisdiction may be applied any longer by member states in relation to consumers and employees domiciled outside the EU. Such uniform rules of jurisdiction will also apply in relation to parties domiciled outside the EU in situations where the courts of a member state have exclusive jurisdiction under the recast regulation or where such courts have had jurisdiction conferred on them by an agreement between the parties. Another important change will be a rule on international lis pendens which will allow the courts of a member state, on a discretionary basis, to stay the proceedings and eventually dismiss the proceedings in situations where a court of a third state has already been seized either of proceedings between the same parties or of a related action at the time the EU court is seized. Press Release, The Council of the European Union, Recast of the Brussels I regulation: towards easier and faster circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters within the EU (6 Dec. 2012), 16599/12, PRESSE 483. This new lis pendens rule could be particularly important in cases involving U.S. global class actions.
40. Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 426-27 (2009); Nagareda, supra note 10, at 11-12; Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 14, at 89; Wasserman, supra note 11, at 335-69 (offering an overview of "salient differences" between the preclusion doctrines in Europe and the United States).
41. See Resolution, supra note 20. Some analyses of procedural issues are available. See S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union: Constitutional Rights in the Face of the Brussels I Regulation, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Brussels I].
42. Virtually all existing commentary on the use of collective redress in Europe focuses on procedural issues rather than regulatory concerns. See generally EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012)
43. see also Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures - European Debates, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 379, 380 (2009)
44. Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe: The New Model, 29 Crv.JusT. Q. 370, 370 (2010) [hereinafter Hodges, Collective]
45. Christopher Hodges, What Are People Trying to Do in Resolving Mass Issues, How Is It Going, and Where Are We Headed?, in THE ANNALS, supra note 15, at 330, 338 [hereinafter Hodges, Resolving]
46. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 177, 181 (2009)
47. Rachael Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Action Reform in England: A Critique and a Proposal, 127 L.Q. REV. 288, 289 (2011)
48. Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 426-27; Laura Carballo Pineiro, Collective Redress in the Proposal for a Brussels I bis Regulation: A Coherent Approach?, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES UNTERNEHMENS- UND VERBRAUCHERRECHT - J. EUR. CONSUMER & MARKET L. 81 (2012)
49. Francesco Rizzuto, Does the European Community Have Legal Competence to Harmonise National Procedural Rules Governing Private Actions for Damages From Infringements of European Community Antitrust Rules?, 2 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 29, 29-30 (2009)
50. Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 141, 164-79 (2010)
51. Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401 (2002); Strong, Brussels I, supra note 30;
52. S.I. Strong, Cross-Border Collective Redress and Individual Participatory Rights: Quo Vadis? 32 Crv. JUST. Q. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Quo Vadis]
53. Gerhard Wagner, Collective Redress - Categories of Loss and Legislative Options, 127 L.Q. REV. 55, 55 (2011).
54. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 345. However, this does not necessarily mean that the procedures do not also include regulatory elements. See Directorate General, supra note 19, at 38; MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63, 66; Bignami, supra note 5, at 441-59 (discussing regulatory styles of France, Germany, Britain, and Italy); Hodges, Resolving, supra note 34, at 336-38; Christopher Hodges, Europeanization of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues, 26 Crv. JUST. Q. 96, 117-18, 121 (2007) [hereinafter Hodges, Europeanization].
55. Failure to recognize the regulatory effect of a particular procedure can lead to unintended overdeterrence. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 377 (2010); Russell, supra note 34, at 151 n.47.
56. Creation of the new mechanism for cross-border collective redress will follow the ordinary legislative procedure. See Resolution, supra note 20,1 29; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 294, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 173 [hereinafter TFEU] (oudining the ordinary legislative procedure, also known as the co-decision procedure). The European Commission is scheduled to disclose its first proposed initiative in the fourth quarter of 2012. See Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 20, Item 110, COM (2011) 777 final (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp2012- annex-en.pdf; Commission Actions to be Adopted, 30/03/2012-31/12/ 2012, Legislative Proposals, available at
57. http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/forward-programming-2012.pdf.
58. See Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 357 (Mathias Reiman & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006).
59. New governance theory attempts to identify new regulatory mechanisms that fall between traditional command and control models of regulation and deregulated markets. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2100 (2008)
60. (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008)
61. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008))
62. see also R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGAUSM (2011)
63. DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1998);
64. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501 (2009)
65. Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 872-73 (2011)
66. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998)
67. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 54 (2011); Scott, supra note 1, at 652.
68. New governance theory supplies a new critical perspective on questions of institutional design. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 3 (1992) ("Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government regulation⋯ [S]ound policy analysis is about understanding private regulation⋯ and how it is interdependent with state regulation⋯");
69. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 882 (2003) (suggesting "the way past the current impasse is to return to [a] commitment to a legal decisionmaking process that is deeply informed about the institutions with which legal actors interact").
70. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 177-78 (2007) (noting dispute systems design "is not a dispute resolution methodology itself but instead reflects "the intentional and systematic creation of an effective, efficient, and fair dispute resolution process based upon the unique needs of a particular system").
71. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 9 (2001)
72. KELEMEN, supra note 41; ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 171 (2009)
73. (concluding that "regulation by litigation is [not] appropriate"); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed.) (2002)
74. Gillian K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401, 405 (2007)
75. Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2007)
76. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Regulation by Litigation, 9 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'YPRAC. GROUPS 109 (2008)
77. William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710 (2006).
78. See Hensler, supra note 15, at 13; Hodges, Resolving, supra note 34, at 338; see also supra note 17. Interestingly, U.S. courts have begun to identify differences between class and collective procedures. See Velez v. Perrin Holder & Davenport Cap- ital Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 445, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
79. JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, 931 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
80. The economic relationship between the European Union and the United States is the largest in the world, with trade flows of approximately $3.6 billion a day. See European Union, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/ europe/european-union (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (citing figures from 2010).
81. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA PROTOCOL ON COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CANADA-U.S. CROSS-BORDER CLASS ACTIONS & ABA NOTICE PROTOCOL: COORDINATING NOTICE (S) TO THE CLASS (ES) IN MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS PROCEEDINGS (2011), available at http://www.cba.org/cba/resblutions/pdf/ll-03- A-bckd.pdf
82. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES (2003), available at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supreme-court/practice-and- procedure/practice-directions-and-notices/General/Guidelines%20Cross- Border%20Cases.pdf
83. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (2010)
84. CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSULTATION PAPER: CANADIAN JUDICIAL PROTOCOL FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS (2011)
85. INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR RECOGNISING AND ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS (2008), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Default.aspx?q= guidelines%20for%20Recognising%20and%20enforcing;
86. see also Betsy M. Adeboyejo, Protocols for Cross-Border Cases⋯Will They Work?, ABA Now (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/protocols- for-cross-border-cases-%E2%80%A6-will-they-work/.
87. See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13; Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 695, 699-703 (2005).
88. These regulatory bodies typically must be set up by international agreement, since no state has worldwide authority over regulatory concerns. See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 13; see also Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (1956), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html*A1.1 (acting as worldwide regulator of matters relating to nuclear energy).
89. See Stewart, supra note 66, at 703 (describing international regulation as involving "a web of interactions and influences, horizontal, vertical, and diagonal, among a diverse multiplicity of different regimes and actors, resembling nothing so much as a Jackson Pollock painting"); see also Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, 14 ICCA CONG. SER. 10-11 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2008).
90. See Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 491, 494 (2012) (noting "international regulations, if any, may not come as quickly as the urgency of the problems would demand");
91. Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 31, 43 (2008).
92. Luff, supra note 8, at 96 (quoting ANDREW P. MORISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 1 (2009)); see also Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 252-53.
93. See Jodie A. Kirschner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations to Europe?: Extraterritorialism, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012)
94. Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison; Correcting the Supreme Court's "Transactional Test," 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 405 (2012).
95. See Buxbaum, Securities, supra note 10, at 18-67; Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 272-93; Kirschner, supra note 72; Nagareda, supra note 10, at 19-41; S.I. Strong, Mass Torts and Arbitration: Lessons From Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, In UNCERTAINTY AND MASS TORT: CAUSATION AND PROOF (José Ferrer Beltran et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Mass Torts]; Ventoruzzo, supra note 72, at 443.
96. See supra note 14. However, difficulties can arise even when procedures in the two countries are similar. See S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 921, 926-27 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Canada].
97. See Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981, 981-82, 1013 (2009) (noting that these views arose in the sixteenth and seventeendi centuries).
98. See Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. Ramello, The Simple Economics of Class Action: Private Provision of Club and Public Goods, 32 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 205, 209-12, 222-23 (2011)
99. Giovanni B. Ramello, Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency, 32 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 63, 64 (2012).
100. See Buxbaum, Transnational, supra note 10, at 261; Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and the Limits of Economics, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 253, 267-68 (2010) (discussing inconsistent actions taken by the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission with respect to Microsoft, as well as the proposed merger between Honeywell and General Electric); see also
101. William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1036 n.67 (2012) (discussing three transadantic scrapes between the U.S. Department of Jusdce and European entities.); Stewart, supra note 66, at 695 ("[T]he past twenty-five years have witnessed a dramatic shift of regulatory authority from the nation state to a dizzying variety of global regulatory regimes, including international organizations, transnational networks of national regulatory officials, and private or hybrid private-public regulatory bodies.").
102. Mark Gelowitz, Court Certifies Class Action Against Imax: Liability May be Coming Soon to a Theatre Near You, LAW. WKLY., Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=1103 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012); see also Silver, [2009] O.J. No. 5573; Silver, [2009] O.J. No. 5585; Monestier, supra note 11, at 75 n.260; Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 927.
103. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.ll (2010) (Stevens, J. concurring) (defining "foreign-cubed" actions).
104. See Arjan de Boode & Allard Huizing, The Netherlands as an Alternative Forum for Cross Border Class Settlements and the Potential Consequences for Claims by "Foreign Cubed" Plaintiffs under U.S. Securities Laws, GREENBURG TRAURIG ALERT (Jan. 2010), http://www.gtlaw.com/News- Events/Publications/Alerts/132898/The-Netherlands-as-an-Alternative-Forum-for- Cross-Border-Class-Settlements-and-the-Potential-Conse-quences-for-Claims-by- Foreign-Cubed-Plaintiffs-under-US-Securities-Laws (last visited Sept. 28, 2012)
105. Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsigh Scheurleer, The Netherlands, in The ANNALS, supra note 15, at 149, 153-55. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal has recendy confirmed a setdement involving a pan-European class. See Hofs-Amsterdam 17 Januari 2012, (Scor Holding (Switz.) AG/Liechtensteinische Landesbank AG) (Neth.), English translation available at
106. http://www.converiumsetdement.com/images/stories/documents/ Decision%2017%20January%202012.pdf. (often referring to the setdement itself as SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG/Zurich Fin. Serv. Ltd. Stichüng Converium Sec. Compensation Found./Vereniging (VEBNCVB)).
107. See Michael M. Karayanni, A Model Typology for Class Actions: Lessons From Israel, in Cross Border Class Actions, Brussels, Belgium, 27 April 2012
108. see also DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 121-22 (2000); MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63, 66 (explaining the different objectives of different nations' class action regimes);
109. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 74-76 (2008) (arguing that private enforcement is a cost-effective way to protect public rights).
110. Michaels, supra note 40, at 357 (discussing equivalence functionalism); see also Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory *, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 74-76 (2009)
111. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228-29 (1999).
112. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976)
113. see also Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1997) (explaining the regulatory role of the courts); Luff, supra note 8, at 101 (analyzing theories of regulatory litigation).
114. This view is not limited to Europe. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress Public Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 331, 368 (2011).
115. Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE and STATE AUTHORITY (1986)).
116. See id. at 3; see also Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 886 (2012) ("Federal agencies routinely contract with each other to exchange money, regulatory power, and governmental services.").
117. See Ronald A. Brand, Private Law and Public Regulation in U.S. Courts, in 2 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION (CILE) STUDIES 115, 115 (2005).
118. Id.; see also Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1155 (2003)
119. (reviewing W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS (2002)) (arguing that it is not new to have regulation by litigation);
120. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159, 174 (2011) ("Both regulation and litigation ultimately have a regulatory effect").
121. European regulations are immediately enforceable in the European Union and do not need to be given domestic effect through the enactment of any enabling legislation by the individual Member States. See European. Commission, What are EU Regulations?, http://ec.europa.eu/eu-law/introduction/what- regulation-en.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). As such, regulations exist in the same form in all Member States. See id. European directives, on the other hand, must be implemented by national legislatures before taking effect. See id. As a result, the principles embodied in a European directive will be available in slighüy different form in individual Member States, although the directive should theoretically have the same effect through-out the European Union. See id.
122. The problems of unanticipated regulatory issues are readily apparent in the context of the recent financial crisis. For example, as one commentator noted: Identifying unanticipated risk is hard and diere is no reason to think that the same busy federal officials, who apparendy overlooked these risks in 2006 and 2007, will become more prescient simply because they serve together on an elite Council. The presence of the one independent expert is helpful, but there was no lack of experts in the late 2000s who warned of an impending financial collapse. There were also some savvy investors and economists who anticipated the collapse, but the financial regulators and the US intelligence community apparendy took no notice of that. Steve Charnovitz, Addressing Government Failure Through International Financial Law, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 743, 748 (2010) (citation omitted).
123. For example, this definition can be used to consider whether certain types of mass, class, or collective arbitration constitute a form of "regulatory arbitration." See S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of "Regulatory Arbitration" - Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2146626 [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Arbitration].
124. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §1.1, at 1-11 (2d ed. 1993)
125. see also Lorian Hardcastle, Government Tort Liability for Negligence in the Health Sector: A Critique of the Canadian Jurisprudence, 37 QUEEN'S L.J. 525, 541 (2012) (contrasting judicial remedies, including damages, injunctions, and declaratory relief, with remedies available to other regulators, including "ombudsmen, commissioners and auditors" whose powers are typically limited to "publicity and persuasion").
126. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979)
127. (referring to "class-action remed[y]"); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (referencing "class remedies"), cert, denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012);
128. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1139 (11th Cir. 2010) (referring to "class action remedy");
129. Can-field v. United States, 14 Ct. CI. 687, 689 (1988) (distinguishing the class remedy under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
130. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 740 (4th ed. 1983) (describing class actions as "one of the most socially useful remedies in history") (citation omitted);
131. Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class Certification Orders, 63 HASTINGS LJ. 1023, 1063 & n.185 (2012) [hereinafter Gidi, Issue Preclusion]
132. (citing PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, at 118-29 (2010)).
133. See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 457, 469-74 (2000)
134. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CAL. L. REV. 277, 287-89 (2010); see also infra notes 224-31.
135. Id. at 68; see also Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 754 (2008) (considering how compensatory relief serves regulatory ends).
136. See Russell, supra note 34, at 145 - 48. The most well-known example of this kind of seemingly callous cost-benefit analysis involves Ford Motor Company's approach to design defects in the Pinto automobile. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1991).
137. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 569 (2000).
138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3). Sometimes treble damages are available as a matter of statutory law. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (2006); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (2006); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) ("Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees."); Glover, supra note 2, at 1151. Other times, multiplers are imposed as a matter of common law. See
139. Jim Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525, 531 (2011).
140. Some U.S. commentators believe that use of aggregative techniques such as MDL is likely to rise because of the difficulties associated with certification of classes in mass torts cases. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 776-77, 806 (2010).
141. See Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2541; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)
142. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct 1758 (2010). Not all commentators read these decisions as being entirely negative. See
143. Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011)
144. S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, First Principles].
145. See Hensler, supra note 15, at 16-17 (noting most aggregated claims settle); see also Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 123 (2012) ("Settlement is the 'endgame' of mass tort litigation. And with the general demise of class actions in this field, mass tort litigation is increasingly resolved through non-class aggregate settlements."); Id. at 139-53 (discussing the evolution of non-class aggregate settlements); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 108-09.
146. See Glover, supra note 2, at 1213-14 (suggesting MDL procedures can operate in a regulatory manner). Thus far, much of the scholarly focus on MDL has been on procedural issues radier than regulatory or policy concerns regarding matters of institutional design. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000)
147. Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
148. Luff, supra note 8, at 113. Of course, other commentators view the existence of regulatory gaps as reflecting a need for private action. See Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New Frontiers for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 654-659 (noting this need may arise particularly in cases where there has been "political failure" or where those with "no potential for [political] redress" have been affected).
149. Glover, supra note 2, at 1158; see also Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (describing the interplay between public and private concerns in third-party verification).
150. See Nathan Howe, The Political Question Doctrine's Role in Climate Change Nuisance Litigation: Are Power Utilities the First of Many Casualties*, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11229, 11238-40 (2010) (discussing courts' views on the propriety of litigation prior to the enactment of legislation);
151. Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 248 (2005). Some public bodies may consciously choose not to act in some cases, although "[o]ne of the most significant risks of executive-driven moratoria is their likelihood to invite legal battles."
152. Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Moratoria, 61 DUKE LJ. 1883, 1927 (2012).
153. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (discussing that Rule 23 cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify" any substantive right (citation omitted)). A pre-existing substantive norm constitutes the second element of the three-prong test for bottom-up regulatory litigation. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154. See Deposit Guar. Nat 'I Bank, 445 U.S. at 339; see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 483 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Abaclat Award], available at http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction. pdf;
155. S.I Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanization of Class Arbitration, 26 ARB. INT'L 493, 502 (2010) [hereinafter Strong, De-Americanization].
156. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 n.14 (1979)
157. Ellis v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 550 So. 2d 1310, 1318 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
158. This is particularly true given Unat there is some legislative oversight of judicial rule-making. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72, 2074 (2006) (requiring Congressional approval of rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)
159. Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1066-67 (2011) (discussing legislative limits on judicial rule-making).
160. The one exception would be in constitutional cases in legal systems where the courts have the final say on such matters. See Dimitrios Kyritsis, Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 320-24 (2012).
161. Although commentators have focused heavily on the analysis of default rules in the context of contract and corporate law, relatively little attention has been paid to default provisions in the realm of regulatory litigation and other questions of institutional design. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 89 (1989) (noting lack of scholarship on default rules); see also
162. Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE LJ. 881, 885 (2003) (supporting modern contract scholarship and results it provides in "clarifying⋯ contract rules," "illuminating⋯ default rule[s]," and "underscoring⋯ renegotiation")
163. Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999) (discussing optimal default rules for contractual incompleteness through understanding underlying reasons for the incompleteness);
164. Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729, 729-30 (1992) (explaining gap-filling for incomplete contracts);
165. Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE LJ. 615, 615 (1990) (analyzing the economic impact of Hadley v. Baxendale);
166. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE LJ. 829, 834, 839 (2003) (comparing how contract lawyers and economists construct default rules about contracts).
167. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 840-70 (2004)
168. Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (2011).
169. The type of precautions to be taken depends on the nature of the substantive risk in question and not on the likelihood of bilateral versus multilateral litigation. For example, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer might undergo additional testing so as to avoid any potential claims that personal injuries that might arise from the use of a particular drug were negligently caused, while a national corporation might require extensive management training and voluntary internal audits of regional hiring or promotion practices so as to anticipate and avoid claims of employment discrimination. See Daphne Richemond-Barak, Regulating War: A Taxonomy in Global Administrative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1056-67 (2011). Although some critics see these sorts of "defensive" measures as unnecessarily costly and socially undesirable to the extent they delay certain products (such as pharmaceuticals) from reaching the market or increase the cost of those items, self-restraint (like self-regulation) may be preferable to mandatory forms of public regulation, which could be more onerous. See
170. Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 29-30 (2011); see infra notes 257-270 and accompanying text.
171. Some authorities frame the ability to proceed as class or collective as a remedy. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979)
172. Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2011), cert, denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012);
173. Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1139 (11th Cir. 2010);
174. Canfield v. United States, 14 CI. Ct. 687, 689 (1988); Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note 153, at 1065 & n. 185; WRIGHT, supra note 153, §72, at 740. Others suggest it may be some type of right. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997); Gidi, Issue Preclusion, supra note 153, at 1065 & n.185.
175. Although detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it would be very useful to conduct a rights-balancing analysis concerning class and collective relief, on the one hand, and regulatory concerns on the other. Some general information on this topic is available. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 535 (2003)
176. Virgílio Afonso da Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273, 284-299 (2011); Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 473.
177. See Luff, supra note 8, at 113. Interestingly, the two concepts do not have to be mutually exclusive. See Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Human Rights and Remedial Equilibration: Equilibrating Socio-Economic Rights, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453, 501 (2011) (discussing how rights may incorporate a remedy); see also Strong, Regulatory Arbitration, supra note 150, at 64-81 (discussing how investment law may recognize a right to a remedy).
178. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 870-71 (1999) (citations omitted)
179. (discussing Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979)); see also id. at 857-58 (explaining difference between rights and remedies). The notion that remedies are in some way subordinate to rights may also be reflected in the laws of some European Member States. See
180. Antony Lester, The Human Rights Act 1998 - Five Years On, 2004 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 258, 260.
181. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 613; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010)
182. Bisaillon v. Concordia University, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666 H 15, 17 (Can.); Strong, Canada, supra note 79, at 965-75.
183. See Jamie Dodge, The Limits of Private Procedural Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 733 (2011); see also Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Dissenting Opinion 86 (Oct. 28, 2011), available at
184. http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat-Dissenting-Opinion.pdf.
185. The elevation of substance over procedure may be more apparent in civil law than in criminal law. See Dodge, supra note 228, at 731-57. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that criminal law protects procedure more than substance. See Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy and Proportionality, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1585, 1595 n.57 (2012)
186. Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Proteding Vulnerable Victims After Crawford, 8 STAN. J. CIV.RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 183, 184 (2012).
187. See Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 159, 169-72 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee ed., 2012); Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 475; see also
188. Mauro Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative Constitutional, International, and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651, 652 (1973) (examining "the more significant aspects of procedural gurantees"). See generally Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 34 (examining new European resolution creating an avenue for regional collective relief).
189. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, effective June 1, 2010 (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 & 14), available at http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm; see also Le Sueur, supra note 155, at 457-58 (discussing the right to an effective remedy under the European Convention on Human Rights).
190. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, art. 47, 18 Dec. 2000; see also Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Judge-Made Standards of National Procedure in the Post-Lisbon Constitutional Framework, 37 EUR. L. REV. 90, 95-97 (2012) (discussing the "fundamental right to an effective 'remedy'"); Hess, supra note 241, at § 8.4;
191. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Document, 2004 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 37, 46 (explaining the current limited system of remedies for private parties).
192. See Dodge, supra note 228, at 770-83 (explaining the public-private distinction). Western legal analysis tends to focus on individual rights and remedies radier than group rights. See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 734 (1986). However, large-scale litigation includes a number of public benefits. See
193. Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 74 n.36 (2010) [hereinafter Luff, Memphis]; HENSLER ET AL., supra note 113, at 121-22; MULHERON, supra note 9, at 63, 66; Burch, supra note 113, at 74-76
194. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Strong, First Principles, supra note 178, at 227-29 (analyzing use of waivers in class arbitration context).
195. Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation in the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009).
196. Bingham et al., supra note 252, at 5; see also Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 80 (2009).
197. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 368 (1986).
198. Raniere v. Ciügroup Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Dodge, supra note 228, at 772-83;
199. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 796 nn.118-19 (2002) (citing cases regarding waivers). But see LaVoice v. UBS Fin. Serv., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2308(BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 124590, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012) (declining to follow Raniere).
200. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Dodge, supra note 228, at 782;
201. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 536, 544, 565 (2012) (noting class waivers are widespread in some types of consumer transactions but not in others); Glover, supra note 2, at 1165-67 (noting increasing use of waivers of class arbitration and litigation).
202. See Glover, supra note 2, at 1154 (noting scarce public resources have long been "the rule, not the exception" in the United States); see also Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1132-34 (2007) (predicting the aftermath of Buckhannon will reduce private enforcement efforts and acknowledging it is "unlikely that there will be an infusion of funds into state and federal enforcement to fill the breach");
203. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1415-16 (2011) (noting "more public enforcement is actually necessary to effectuate the goals of a statute," as evidence suggests an overreliance on private action results in "under-enforcement of the law");
204. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1000-04 (2010) (acknowledging the limits of public enforcement).
205. See Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1197-98 (1998)
206. Byron G. Stier, PIP Breast Implants and Mass Torts in Europe, MASS TORT LITIGATION BLOG (Jan. 30, 2012), http://lawprofes-sors.typepad.com/mass-tort- litigation/2012/01/pip-breast-implants-and-mass-torts-in-europe.html [hereinafter PIP Breast Implants] (describing the traditional European approach as "more reliant on criminal law than tort for deterrence, compensatory damages are limited because of the comparatively extensive governmental social insurance, punitive damages are unavailable, and class actions are traditionally not embraced."). See generally
207. Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalization of Products Liability: An Invitation to Political Abuse, Preemption, and Non-Enforcement, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 341 (2008) (arguing the criminalization of products liability is "neither necessary, nor desirable.").
208. See Burch, supra note 113, at 70-77, 128; Jules L. Coleman, Mistakes, Misunderstandings, and Misalignments, 121 YALE LJ. ONLINE 541, 564-65 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/tort- law/mistakes,-misun-derstandings,-and-misalignments/; Stier, supra note 266.
209. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1431 (2011).
210. See Abigail C. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 288, 304-05 (2012) (noting size affects informational asymmetries).
211. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Stephenson, supra note 284, at 1428-29, 1447-53 (considering judicial informational disadvantages). Generous rules regarding notice pleading eliminate the need for plaintiffs to have evidence of their allegations at the time of filing, although recent Supreme Court decisions have tightened the pleading standard in the United States. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)
212. Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba, Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (2011) (comparing pleading standards inside and outside the U.S.).
213. See Dodson & Klebba, supra note 292, at 7-8. Of all the European Member States, only England recognizes a right to discovery similar to that used in the U.S., although even then, the scope of disclosure is construed much more narrowly than in the United States. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 489, 501-03, 522-23 (2010).
214. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 43 (1991); See Glover, supra note 2, at 1204.
215. See Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL JUSTICE, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting-public/news-consulting-0054-en.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (containing approximately 19,000 submissions made as part of the European Commission's public consultation on collective redress); Valguarnera, supra note 19, at 1-2.
216. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1322-23 (1999)
217. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1069 (1997). But see
218. Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 217-18 (2011) (arguing "courts and Congress each present interest groups with different costs and benefits," and in certain conditions seeking a federal court opinion is "significantly less" costly than lobbying Congress for a statutory change).
219. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490-91, 1505-07 (2008) (discussing the strategy and success rate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a non-profit advocacy group formed by corporate interests to promote a pro-business agenda at the Supreme Court).
220. See Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1141, 1155-57 (2003); see also Cassone & Ramello, supra note 86, at 223 (suggesting that that "[c] lass action can thus re-establish the alignment between public and individual interests where there are no credible alternatives").
221. Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, Seeking Rents Through Class Actions and Legislative Lobbying: A Comparison, 32 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 293, 303 (2011).
222. Reza Rajabiun, Private Enforcement and Judicial Discretion in the Evolution of Antitrust in the United States, 8 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 187, 200 (2012).
223. See Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 53 (2008) ("Second-generation learning can benefit as much from understanding why designs fail as it can from understanding why they succeed.").
224. See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22-23; Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 27, at 452-53; Sarah A. Westby, Note, Associations to the Rescue: Reviving the Consumer Class Action in the United States and Italy, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 195-96 (2011).
225. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301, 310-11 (2007)
226. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil - A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 322, 324 n.22 (2003).
227. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 350-51; Hensler, supra note 15, at 22-23; Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 360-66 (2011); Robertson, supra note 140, at 161-62.
228. See Hensler, supra note 15, at 22-23; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shifi Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 125, 146-48 (2003); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 202, at 517-22.
229. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the Rule of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 76-78 (2011); Cohen, supra note 253, at 54-60; Franck, supra note 45, at 177-78;
230. Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 176 (2009) [hereinafter McGovern, DSD]
231. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23, 130 (2011)
232. Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 46-47 (2010) (discussing areas where DSD has been used).