Antitrust divergence and the limits of economics

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 104, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 253-291

  Devlin, Alan ^a   Jacobs, Michael ^b  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b De Paul University College of Law

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 78149327981     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (264)

1. See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in the Application of Antitrust to Intellectual Property, Remarks to the George Mason Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6, 2004), in 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 259 (2005)
2. Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive View, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 25-26
3. Charles A. James, Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, International An-titrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence, Address Before the OECD Global Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf
4. Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, EU & US Antitrust Policies-Our Shared Belief in Competitive Markets, Opening Remarks at 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_theme_22.html (fol-low "en" hyperlink listed next to speech date and title; then follow "EN" hyperlink for PDF)
5. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Convergence, Conflict, and Comity: The Search for Coherence in International Competition Policy, Remarks at the 34th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy, (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070927fordham.pdf
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, International Competition Network Confe-rence Promotes Convergence Among World's Antitrust Enforcers (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/209437.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423 (2005)
8. Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason: The U.S./E.U. Treatment of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453 (2005)
9. Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 18
10. Nathan R. Viavant, Comment, Agreeing to Disagree?: Continuing Uncertainties in Transatlantic Merger Clearance Post-EC Merger Regulation, 17 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 177 (2008)
11. Press Release, Thomas O. Barnett, As-sistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement on European Microsoft Decision (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Europe Does Antitrust Its Way, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at C1.
13. See Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 36 (holding that Micro-soft's refusal to share proprietary information necessary to allow rivals to interoperate with its operating system constituted an abuse of a dominant position); cf. Stephen Labaton, Microsoft Finds Legal De-fender in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at A1 (describing the Justice Department's defense of Microsoft both at home and abroad).
14. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust in a Trans-atlantic Context-From the Cicada's Perspective, Remarks at the Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context Conference (June 7, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203973.pdf (explor-ing U.S./EC divergence and noting that "unilateral conduct remains the area of greatest separation").
15. See infra note 9.
16. See Barnett, supra note 2 ("We are concerned that the standard applied to unilateral conduct by the [Court of First Instance], rather than helping consumers, may have the unfortunate consequence of harming consumers by chilling innovation and discouraging competition."); see also infra note 115 (providing additional examples).
17. See Michael Elliott, The Anatomy of the GE-Honeywell Disaster, TIME, July 8, 2001, at 5, availa-ble at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,166732-2,00.html (quoting Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill as criticizing the EC's decision regarding the GE-Honeywell merger as "off the wall")
18. Barnett, supra note 2 (criticizing the EC decision against Microsoft as potentially damaging to consum-ers).
19. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Antitrust Armageddon: Thomas Barnett v. Neelie Kroes, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 19, 2007, 2:28 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/19/antitrust-law-armageddon-thomas-barn ett-v-neelie-kroes/
20. David Lawsky, EU Official Lambasts U.S. Justice Dept on Microsoft, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL1926927820070919.
21. EC Commissioner Neelie Kroes reportedly said:"It is totally unacceptable that a representative of the U.S. administration criticized an independent court of law outside its jurisdiction. The European Com-mission does not pass judgment on rulings by U.S. courts, and we expect the same degree of respect." Id.
22. See Neelie Kroes, Member of the European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Prelimi-nary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537 (fol-low"EN" hyperlink for PDF) ("I think that competition policy evolves as our understanding of econom-ics evolves. In days gone by, fairness'played a prominent role in [U.S.] enforcement in a way that is no longer the case. I don't see why a similar development could not take place in Europe.")
23. see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107-15 (1978).
24. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) ("It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for the protection of competition, not competitors.'" (quot-ing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)))
25. Neelie Kroes, Editorial, Why Micro-soft Was Wrong, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Sept. 26, 2007, at 13 ("U.S. and EU antitrust laws agree on most things, not least the objective of benefiting consumers.")
26. MARGARET BLOOM, SUBSTANTIAL ANTITRUST CONVERGENCE: DEVELOPED COUNTRY ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IS CONVERGING ON A CONSUMER WELFARE BASIS (2005), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ic/pdf/spring/05/aba-co nvergence-final.pdf.
27. See Antitrust Division Organization Chart (2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/org.htm
28. European Comm'n Directorate Gen. for Competition, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/role_en.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010)
29. Economic Advisory Group, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
30. See Thomas Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Section 2 Reme-dies: A Necessary Challenge, Presentation at the Fordham Competition Law Institute (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/226537.pdf (opining that"there seems to be con-sensus that we should prohibit unilateral conduct only where it is demonstrated through rigorous eco-nomic analysis to harm competition and thereby to harm consumer welfare").
31. See BORK, supra note 10, at 122.
32. For sure, many aspects of antitrust law are capable of being accurately analyzed under the lens of economics.
33. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 57-58, 69-73 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining the static efficiency benefits of competition).
34. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994-96 (1997).
35. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003) (focusing on evaluating the economic efficiency of intellectual property law)
36. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004) (discussing incentive sys-tems and their ability to encourage technological or scientific advances).
37. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP (Trinko), 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (reasoning that courts should avoid over-interference in the workings of the free market).
38. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 352-57.
39. See id.
40. As explored below, there are good reasons to be skeptical of long-run harm in predatory pricing scenarios. See infra Part III.B. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the current illustration, we take this potential harm as a given.
41. Compare Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1992) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing demonstrate"that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or. a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices"), with Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, 3372-74 (condemning below-cost pricing without consideration to the dominant undertaking's ability to recoup its losses).
42. See BORK, supra note 10, at 299-309, 365-81
43. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197-207 (2d ed. 2001).
44. Europe's recent decision to forbid the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows was based on just this logic.
45. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows (Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/15 (follow"EN" hyperlink for PDF). The bundling of Internet browsing software with Microsoft's operating system car-ries axiomatic and significant consumer benefits by providing them with goods most of them will con-sume, thereby allowing them to avoid the transaction and negotiation costs of acquiring them separately.
46. See BORK, supra note 10, at 365-81.
47. Meanwhile, the economics of complementary effects strongly suggest that the purveyor of such goods will charge a smaller price in combination than it would sepa-rately.
48. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 638.
49. The European Commission surely found that these undeniable short-run benefits were outweighed by what it perceived to be the long-run danger to a competitive market structure. In particular, it considered that Microsoft's dominant market share created an impediment to free entry.
50. See Press Release, European Comm'n, supra (opining that"the tying of Internet Explorer with Windows, which makes Internet Explorer available on 90% of the world's PCs, distorts competition on the merits between competing web browsers insofar as it provides Internet Explorer with an artificial distribution advantage which other web browsers are unable to match"). In short, present efficiency arguments notwithstanding, the possibility that free entry may be frustrated in the future was sufficient to condemn the behavior under review. This decision, which placed long-run considerations ahead of short-run efficiencies, would never have been reached across the Atlantic. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This is a particu-larly acute example of a broader phenomenon. As a general matter, Europe displays a greater predispo-sition toward regulatory intervention, driven in no small way by its relative skepticism toward the free market's long-run ability to remedy immediate harm.
51. See William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 550 (2002).
52. See BORK, supra note 10, at 225-45.
53. See id. at 241; POSNER, supra note 24, at 226.
54. See BORK, supra note 10, at 241
55. POSNER, supra note 24, at 226.
56. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 225-26.
57. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 429-30.
58. See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Vertical Restraints and Vertical As-pects of Mergers-A U.S. Perspective, Remarks Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 16-17, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/fordham7.shtm.
59. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 638.
60. See, e.g., Commission Decision COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2004 O.J. (L48) 1 (EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf (ruling that the proposed General Electric and Honeywell merger would result in excessive concentration).
61. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, Remarks Before the Antitrust Law Section, State Bar of Georgia (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf ("Crucial to the EU's theories of competitive harm are the predictions-fueled by Honeywell's rivals-that rivals would be forced to exit in the face of a strengthened Honeywell.").
62. See id
63. See Oracle and Sun Microsystems: Merger Interruptus, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 2009, at 98.
64. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Antitrust Division Issues State-ment on the European Commission's Decision Regarding the Proposed Transaction Between Oracle and Sun (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/251782.htm.
65. See Aoife White, EU Says Oracle's Criticisms of Antitrust Probe are "Facile and Superficial," WASH. EXAMINER, Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/economy/ap/eu-says-oracles-criticisms- of-antitrust-probe-are-facile-and-superficial-69651757.html
66. See Press Release, Mergers: Commission Clear Oracle's Proposed Acquisition of Sun Microsys-tems (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/40.
67. See Mark D. Whitener, Domestic Divergence, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 6.
68. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 1 (2008) [hereinafter SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf (describing innovation as"the most important source of economic growth").
69. This conclusion doubtless finds its foundation in Frank Easterbrook's famous 1984 article in the Texas Law Review.
70. See Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984) (noting that courts act with imperfect information and their actions can ultimately harm efficiency).
71. See Press Release, FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice Report,"Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act" (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm.
72. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Mo-nopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/May/09-at-459.html.
73. This is because each jurisdiction is likely to have a distinct sociopolitical view on the merits of short-run gains vis-à-vis facilitating long-run investment.
74. See Platt Majoras, supra note 34 (referring to an explosion in the number of countries enacting antitrust statutes). The latest and most prominent example is provided by China, which enacted its"An-ti-monopoly Law" in 2007.
75. See Full Article of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6466798.html.
76. The history of competition law enforcement is replete with examples of this phenomenon. Illu-stratively, in the United States the Sherman Act-a notoriously flexible piece of legislation-has been employed to a variety of ends, from trust-busting in the early twentieth century to protectionism by the Warren Court to consumer welfare in modern times.
77. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003)
78. William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evi-dentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989).
79. The Sherman Act, in particular, is a conspicuously vague statute, purporting to condemn con-tracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, in addition to prohibiting the willful acquisi-tion or maintenance of monopoly power. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006). The Act is a classic"common law statute," and Congress left to the courts the task of giving meaning to its broad commands. 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). Given the malleability of the statutory rules, anti-trust law is eminently capable of becoming a conduit for enforcers'political predispositions.
80. See Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1 (2005) (noting that the basic ambiguity in market rhetoric"enables competition authorities to invoke the spirit of the market no matter what they do").
81. See Frank Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 440 (2008) (noting that"[a]ntitrust law and bankruptcy law go hand in hand")
82. Deborah Platt Majoras, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n Chairman, National Champions: I Don't Even Think It Sounds Good, Remarks Before the International Competition Conference/EU Competition Day (Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/070326munich.pdf.
83. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 95-99 (explaining how monopoly leads to artificially high prices caused by restrictions in output).
84. European antitrust law has been clearly influenced by the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism, which arose in the aftermath of the failed Weimar Republic. This school of thought saw an open com-petitive process as essential to both a robust economy and effective government. Excessive concentra-tion and monopoly were seen as harbingers of economic ruin and governmental instability.
85. See generally RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 19-20 (LexisNexis UK 5th ed. 2003) (explaining the ordoliberal influence on the development of EU competition policy).
86. See Harold Demsetz, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 371, 381-83 (1976).
87. See generally BORK, supra note 10, at 15-19 (discussing the historical contradictions in U.S. an-titrust law).
88. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008).
89. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
90. See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 211-21.
91. See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82(d), Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
92. See POSNER, supra note 24, at viii (deriding the state of antitrust law in the United States in 1976).
93. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925-34 (1979).
94. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257.
95. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1021 (1987).
96. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
97. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (overruling the Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles, which held that vertical minimum price fixing is illegal per se)
98. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-22 (1997) (overruling its 1968 Albrecht decision, which held that vertical maximum price fixing was a per se antitrust violation).
99. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 314-20 (2007)
100. Brooke Group Ltd. v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-27 (1993).
101. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 (2003)
102. Oliver E. Wil-liamson, The Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice-In Perspective, Remarks at 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines (June 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11257.pdf.
103. See Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES: MICROECONOMICS 283, 307-32 (1997).
104. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Link Line Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1114-15 (2009)
105. J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 280-84 (2008).
106. See Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001) ("[I]t needs to be remembered that the goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal is that there be efficiency.").
107. See BORK, supra note 10, at 122.
108. See Hovenkamp, supra note 65 (reviewing the development and nature of post-Chicago antitrust doctrine); see also Posner, supra note 64 (describing the growing consensus of an economic approach to antitrust doctrine).
109. See GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 79-80 (2007).
110. See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 319-48 (2008)
111. James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340, 371-83 (2007).
112. See Kroes, supra note 10.
113. See, e.g., Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 402-03 (2005).
114. See Platt Majoras, supra note 1.
115. See Donald C. Klawiter & J. Clayton Everett, Global Cartel Enforcement in 2005: Empagran, Executives and Equilibrium, in THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 11 (2005)
116. William J. Ko-lasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. and EU Competition Poli-cy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond, Address Before the Council for the United States and Italy Bi-Annual Conference (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf.
117. See Mark R. Patterson, Revision of the New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation: Convergence or Capitulation?, in THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: WHOSE REGULATION, WHICH COMPETITION? 53, 53 (Hanns Ullrich ed., 2006) ("It is generally believed that Eu-ropean competition law is becoming both more similar to US antitrust law and more based on econom-ics.")
118. David Scheffman & Mary Coleman, Dialogue and Consultation Facilitates Convergence in the Analyses of Mergers in the US and EU, http://www.ftc.gov/be/convergence.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
119. See Kris Dekeyser et al., Coordination Among National Antitrust Agencies, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 58 (2009).
120. See Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft, 2007 OJ (L 32) 23 (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf
121. WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 80-83 (2007)
122. see also David S. Evans et al., United States v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win?, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497 (2005) (discussing the controversial nature of the action taken by the Eu-ropean Commission against Microsoft)
123. Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Op-Ed. EU Antitrust Nonsense, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at A19, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/05/eu-antitrust-nonsense/(c riticizing the EC's decision in the Mi-crosoft case).
124. See Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 498-99 (2002).
125. See Thomas L. Boeder & Gary J. Dorman, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: The Eco-nomics, Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 119, 120 (2000).
126. On February 27, 2008, the European Commission fined Microsoft $1.3 billion-then the largest fine in the history of antitrust enforcement-for charging rivals"unreasonable prices" for gaining access to interface information for work group servers that would facilitate interoperability. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Imposes € 899 Million Penalty on Microsoft for Noncom-pliance with March 2004 Decision (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_75.html#i37_ 792 (follow"Antitrust: Commission imposes." hyperlink; then fol-low"EN" hyperlink for PDF). The offending prices were initial royalty rates of 3.87% of licensees'product revenues for patented information and 2.98% for confidential interoperability information. Id.
127. See Press Release, Microsoft Statement on European Commission Statement of Objections (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2009/jan09/01-16statement.mspx.
128. See Matthew Newman, Intel Fined $1.45 Billion in EU Antitrust Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 13, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=a22oQQl0woQI.
129. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States and European Competition Policy: Are There More Differences than We Care to Admit?, Address Before the European Policy Center (Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10999.pdf ("In the U.S., we believe [calculating negative long-run effects caused by short-run efficiency gains] will generally exceed our limited predictive abilities. We therefore will generally not intervene in these circumstances. We prefer to let markets sort it out.").
130. See BRUNO ZANETTIN, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AGENCIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 221 (2002) ("[T]he definition of market power is much broader under EC law, and dominance is more likely to be found in the European Communities than in the United States.").
131. See generally WHISH, supra note 56, at 178-90 (discussing the EC's governing tests for deter-mining dominant positions in antitrust).
132. See Case T-219/99, British Airways PLC v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917 (finding British Air-ways to be dominant in the UK air travel agency market with a share of 39.7%).
133. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
134. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
135. See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that a firm's market share is a less important consideration than its ability to maintain that market share)
136. see also L.A. Land Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 6 F.3d 1422, 1425-29 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1197 (1994) (explaining that 100% market share does not necessarily demonstrate power to control prices or exclude competition).
137. See Joined Cases C-395/96 P & C-396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge Transps. SA v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. I-1365, 119, 137.
138. See ZANETTIN, supra note 92, at 221.
139. Compare Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (requiring that a plaintiff alleging predatory pricing demonstrate"that the competitor had a reasonable prospect" or"a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost prices"), with Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, 3372-74 (condemning below-cost pricing without considering the dominant undertaking's ability to recoup its losses).
140. See Newman, supra note 90.
141. See generally Richard A. Duncan & Brian S. McCormac, Loyalty & Fidelity Discounts & Re-bates in the U.S. & EU: Will Divergence Occur over Cost-Based Standards of Liability?, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 133, 138-44 (2008) (reviewing applicable case law and concluding that loyalty rebates general-ly withstand judicial scrutiny in the United States).
142. See Comm'n Notice, Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, 141.
143. Compare Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 (finding Micro-soft's tying arrangements as problematic and anticompetitive), with United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Microsoft's tying arrangements are not per se illegal but should judged by the rule of reason).
144. Compare Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Établissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm'n, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 339 (finding geographical and price restrictions on car dealerships to violate antitrust law), with State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-22 (1997) (holding that requiring distributors to sell at certain price restrictions was not anticompetitive) and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (overruling the Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles, which held that vertical mini-mum price fixing is illegal per se).
145. See Kolasky, supra note 91.
146. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
147. See Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 81 (2005).
148. See Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. (IMS Health), 2004 E.C.R. I-5039, 5081-88; Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601; Case C-241/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 815-25.
149. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939-43 (1981).
150. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 207-23.
151. See Thomas Barnett, Assistant Att'y Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks, Intero-perability Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property (Sept. 13, 2006), in 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 865-66 (2007).
152. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 638.
153. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; in Europe, G.E. and Honeywell Ran Afoul of 19th-Century Thinking, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at C2 ("When evaluating a merger, United States antitrust officials tend to focus on the benefits to consumers, while European regulators give substantial weight to the impact on competitors, especially if they are national champions.'")
154. Editorial, Europe to GE: Go Home, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at A14 ("In the Honeywell case, novel antitrust theories have been dreamed up simply because it would be unthinkable to let a large U.S. company go about its business unmolested.").
155. See, e.g., John R. Wilke, U.S. Antitrust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger of GE and Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A3 ("Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors'. The EU decision reflects a significant point of divergence." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 9.
157. See generally Kolasky, supra note 91 (asserting that the United States'deference to market forces diverges from the European approach).
158. Part of this tendency can be explained by the ordoliberal tradition that pervaded parts of Europe at the incipiency of the then European Economic Community (EEC), and the resulting policies that may be traced to the so-called Freiburg School.
159. See Pinar Akman, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Ar-ticle 82EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 267-94 (2009).
160. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 697-98, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=recherc her&numaff=T-201/04 (under the"Cases" column and in the row with"Judgment," follow the"T-201/04" link) (placing the burden on the defendant to prove with specificity that interoperability would reduce incentives to innovate).
161. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923) (italics omitted).
162. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (Apr. 8, 1997); Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1-22 (EC), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/regulations.html#mer ger_reg (EC merger regulations).
163. See generally SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT, supra note 43 (analyzing various forms of single firm conduct, such as exclusionary conduct, price predation, and tying in terms of both the anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects).
164. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
165. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 27-28 (2007) [herei-nafter PROMOTING INNOVATION], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
166. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=recherc her&numaff=T-201/04 (under the"Cases" column and in the row with"Judgment," follow the"T-201/04" link).
167. See Commission Decision 89/205/EEC, Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC & RTE, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43.
168. Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. 367, 643.
169. See Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801 (2001) (describing European intellectual property law on licensing for the benefit of American readers).
170. See, e.g., Press Release, Assistant Att'y Gen. for Antitrust, R. Hewitt Pate, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Issues Statement on the EC's Decision in its Microsoft Investigation (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04_at_184.htm (noting the Justice Department's criticism of the European Commission's decision against
171. Compare, e.g., SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT, supra note 43, (noting the United States generally re-laxes the restrictions on dominant firms), with Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice Report,"Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Sec-tion 2 of the Sherman Act" (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm (criticizing the Department of Justice's Single-Firm Conduct report for weakening antitrust laws and promoting the interests of dominant companies).
172. See supra note 131.
173. See, e.g., Austin Modine, Microsoft to EC: Define 'Unreasonable', REGISTER, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/23/microsoft_responds_to_ec_complai nt/.
174. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) ("The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge mo-nopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts business acumen'in the first place; it induc-es risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct."); Barnett, supra note 113, at 865-66.
175. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.").
176. See Barnett, supra note 113, at 860-61.
177. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 929-30 (2001) (explaining the Schumpeterian nature of competition in high technology markets, whereby the prospect of monopoly returns drives valuable ex ante competition in innovation).
178. See infra Part II.B.
179. See infra Part II.B.
180. See PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 125, at 15-32.
181. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP (Trinko), 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004) (refusing to recognize the essential facility doctrine or another exception to the principle that there is no duty to aid competitors) Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Aspen), 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1984) (stating that a firm with monopoly power has no general duty to cooperate with a competitor)
182. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (affirming, despite the Sherman Act,"the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal").
183. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
184. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 203-05 (2003) (reading Aspen to"imply[] a duty to cooperate with rivals").
185. Aspen, 472 U.S. 585.
186. Id. at 593.
187. Id. at 603.
188. Id. at 606-07.
189. Id. at 608.
190. Id. at 608-09.
191. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 143, at 203-05.
192. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP (Trinko), 540 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2004).
193. Id. at 410.
194. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 125, at 15-32.
195. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Image Tech-nical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insi-tuform of N. Am. Inc., 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
196. see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (finding no duty for telephone company to aid competi-tors under antitrust law by allowing access to its computer system).
197. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1216.
198. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1329.
199. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1981).
200. Id. at 1209.
201. F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997).
202. Id. at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. at 1212.
204. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
205. Id. at 1327.
206. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
207. See, e.g., Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
208. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327-28
209. See, e.g., Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can be Better than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143 (2001) (arguing that the differences between the Xerox and In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. An-titrust Litig. cases did not warrant resolution by the Supreme Court).
210. Compare In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1325-26 (recognizing a patent holder's right to exclude so long as the patent is not fraudulently obtained or used for sham litigantion), with Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215-19 (9th Cir. 1997) (si-milarly recognizing a patent holder's right to exclude within limits).
211. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1329; Kodak, Inc., 125 F.3d at 1218.
212. Cf. PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 125, at 17 (criticizing the Kodak decision on the basis that it is difficult to advise clients with respect to refusals to deal that are"pretextual").
213. See, e.g., Kenneth Glazer, The IMS Health Case: A U.S. Perspective, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1197, 1205 (2006) (noting that"antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic recognize that it is only in the rarest cases that refusing to cooperate with a rival should be prohibited by antitrust law").
214. See Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6232, 8, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61987J0238:E N:HTML.
215. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenver-lag GmbH&Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 7791, 38, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61997J0007:E N:HTML (emphasis added).
216. See AB Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. 39.
217. Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann & Indep. Television Publ'ns. Ltd v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 2.
218. Id.at 822-25.
219. See Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
220. Id. 49, 52 (emphasis added).
221. For the authors'view on this decision, see Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Microsoft's Five Fat-al Flaws, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV 67.
222. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, 690 at 3831, available at http:// curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher& ;numaff=T-201/04 (under the"Cases" column and in the row with"Judgment," follow the"T-201/04" link).
223. Id. 697-98.
224. Id.
225. Id. 330, 332.
226. Indeed, we have argued elsewhere that this agnosticism constitutes a major weakness to Euro-pean competition policy.
227. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 180, at 105-06.
228. See generally Barnett, supra note 113, at 859-61, 865-66 (arguing the importance of dynamic efficiency and innovation in the field of intellectual property and the related societal benefits of realizing these features).
229. See id. at 865-66 (stating that a firm that knows it will have to share its intellectual property will be deterred from investing in its development altogether or in its further advancement after hitting the market).
230. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1892 (2002) ("People innovate for many reasons, and in many industries the exis-tence of IP rights doesn't appear to be chief among them.").
231. See WHISH, supra note 56, at 20-21.
232. See Luigi Zingales, Capitalism After the Crisis, NAT'L AFF., Fall 2009, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/capitalism-after-the- crisis.
233. See Donna M. Gitter, The Conflict in the European Community Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: A Call for Legislative Clarification of the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 217, 297 n.409 (2003).
234. See The Age of Mass Innovation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2007, at 89.
235. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP (Trinko), 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
236. See Kolasky, supra note 25, at 537 ("[The United States has] more confidence in the self-correcting nature of markets [than the European Union]. This confidence is especially strong when the markets are populated by strong rivals and strong buyers, who will usually find ways to protect them-selves from an aspiring monopolist. Our strong belief in markets and our humility in our own predictive abilities lead us to be skeptical of claims by rivals that a merger will lead to their ultimate demise and to demand strong empirical proof before we will accept such claims.").
237. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-85 (1975) (arguing the importance of new technologies, commodities, sources of supply, and types of organizations in driv-ing economic evolution).
238. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
239. See Kolasky, supra note 25, at 537 (explaining that the United States has"more confidence in the self-correcting nature of markets" than the European Union).
240. See Wilke, supra note 116.
241. See supra Part II.B.2.
242. See supra Part II.B.1.
243. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
244. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 10, at ix-xiv.
246. See POSNER, supra note 24, at 207-23.
247. See id. at 207-10.
248. A Type I error occurs when a hypothesis is found to be false when it is actually true.
249. See Katherine L. Gross & Gary G. Mittelbach, What Maintains the Integrity of Science: An Essay for Nonscien-tists, 58 EMORY L.J. 341, 350 (2008). For the authors'view on optimal error analysis in antitrust law
250. see Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, ANTITRUST ERROR, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
251. See HYLTON, supra note 143, at 279-80.
252. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=recherc her&numaff=T-201/04 (under the"Cases" column and in the row with"Judgment," follow the"T-201/04" link)
253. see also John Lo-patka, Leverage in the CFI's Microsoft Decision, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL'Y BLOG, (Sept. 21, 2007), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2007/09/leverage-in- the.html (describing the Court of First Instance's reliance on the concepts of tying and monopoly leverage in the Microsoft case).
254. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The naive objection [to tying arrangements] is that they extend monopoly; the sophisticated objection is that they facilitate price discrimination.").
255. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 16, at 306-08.
256. Id. at 299-300, 308.
257. One of the authors has explained this view in greater detail elsewhere. See Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 543-45 (2007).
258. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 343-44 (2006).
259. See Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 2-3.
260. See, e.g., C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999)
261. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005)
262. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (2007).
263. See generally Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, Success, Dominance, and Intero-perability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157 (2009).
264. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Possibilities and Limits of Decision Theory in Antitrust: A Re-sponse to Professor Horowitz, 52 IND. L.J. 735 (1977) (describing one decisionmaking theory approach and the general obstacles that such theories face in being adopted in the antitrust field, and ultimately concluding that decisionmaking theory should be employed in antitrust law).