Tort law and the American economy

Minnesota Law Review

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 28-89

  Cross, Frank B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859722925     PISSN: 00265535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. Christine L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 401 (2010).
2. Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 1, 2 (Peter W. Hu-ber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
3. Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Set-tlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2004).
4. Pietro S. Nivola, American Social Regulation Meets the Global Econo-my, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES? SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 16, 23 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997).
5. John D. Graham, Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION
6. See Sidney Shapiro et al., The Social Costs of Dangerous Products: An Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 775, 791-829 (2009)
7. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 910-11 (2008)
8. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 142 (2001).
9. See Claudia E. Lavenant et al., Tort Reform and Physician Sanction-ing, 24 LAW & POL'Y 1, 10 tbl.1 (2002) (finding a correlation between joint-liability reform and higher rates of serious sanctions).
10. Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 429 (2005).
11. Donald V. Macdougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives-Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608, 644 (1985).
12. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Funda-mental Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 647 (2003).
13. Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground De-sign, 58 FLA. L. REV. 265, 270 (2006).
14. John N. Frank, Do Legal Costs Really Drive Up the Cost of Doing Business in North America? And Is This the Year That All Changes?, FOR-WARD ONLINE (May/June 2004), http://forward.msci.org/articles/0605tort.cfm
15. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Impli-cations for State Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62, 65, 68 tbl.1 (2005)
16. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 150-53 (1995).
17. Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 996 (2005).
18. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1442 (2008)