Comparing the incommensurable: Constitutional principles, balancing and rational decision

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 273-301

  Da Silva, Virgílio Afonso ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Balancing; Incommensurability; Interpretation; Judicial review; Proportionality

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053048250     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: 14643820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqr004     Document Type: Article

References (185)

1. Donald Regan, 'Value, Comparability, and Choice' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 137-38
2. James Griffin, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) 80
3. In this article, the terms 'balancing' and 'weighing' are used synonymously, and are also to be understood as references to the third step of the so-called principle of proportionality
4. Robert Alexy, 'On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison' (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433-49, 436
5. Frederick Schauer, 'Balancing, Subsumption, and the Constraining Role of Legal Text' (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 34-45, 38
6. Jacco Bomhoff and Lorenzo Zucca, 'The Tragedy of Ms Evans: Conflicts and Incommensurability of Rights' (2006) 2 Eur Constitutional L Rev 424-42, 424
7. See also Alexander Aleinikoff, 'Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing' (1987) 96 Yale L J 943-1005, 943-44
8. Christian Hillgruber, 'Diskussionsbeitrag' (2002) 61 VVDStRL 174-76, 175
9. Stavros Tsakyrakis, 'Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?' (2009) 7 ICON 468-93, 475
10. As Aleinikoff puts it, '[s]ome critics of balancing surely overstate their case by claiming that balancing, because it demands the comparison of "apples and oranges," is impossible' (n 5) 972 (emphasis added)
11. John Alder, 'Incommensurable Values and Judicial Review: The Case of Local Government' [2001] PL 717-35, 717
12. Tsakyrakis (n 6) 471. Tsakyrakis argues further that '[i]f the moral discourse is lacking, there is no way to demonstrate that values, indeed, are commensurable, and it makes no sense, therefore, to pretend that the principle of proportionality allows us to do it' (ibid 474).
13. Laurent B Frantz, 'Is the First Amendment Law? A Reply to Professor Mendelson' (1963) 51 Cal L Rev 729-54, 729
14. See also R George Wright, 'Does Free Speech Jurisprudence Rest on a Mistake? Implications of the Commensurability Debate' (1990) 23 Loy LA L Rev 763-89
15. See his dissenting opinion in Konigsberg v State Bar of California 366 US 36, 61 (1961)
16. Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1996) 368
17. See also Jürgen Habermas, 'Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N Cardozo School of Law' (1996) 17 Cardozo L Rev 1477-557, 1531
18. Tsakyrakis (n 6)
19. See above all Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Julian Rivers tr, OUP, Oxford 2002)
20. See also Robert Alexy, 'Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality' (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 131-40
21. Robert Alexy, 'Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation' (2005) 3 ICON 572-81
22. See further Julian Rivers, 'Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review' (2006) 65 CLJ 174-207
23. Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, 'Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism' (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat'l L 72-165
24. Alexy, A Theory (n 15)
25. Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (2nd edn, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1994)
26. Alexy, A Theory (n 15)
27. Robert Alexy, 'Zum Begriff des Rechtsprinzips' in Robert Alexy (ed), Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs: Studien zur Rechtsphilosophie (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1995) 204
28. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 47
29. Alexy (n 17) 79
30. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 50
31. As will be seen later on (s 4A), some kinds of incommensurability are based on the idea of an absolute relation of precedence among values
32. Alexy, 'Constitutional Rights' (n 15) 137
33. Alexy (n 17) 83
34. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 53
35. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 54
36. Alexy (n 17) 84
37. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 54
38. Thomas Nagel, 'The Fragmentation of Value' in Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979) 131
39. Cass R Sunstein, 'Incommensurability and Valuation in Law' (1994) 92 Mich L Rev 779-861, 796
40. Joseph Boyle, 'Free Choice, Incomparably Valuable Options, and Incommensurable Categories of Good' (2002) 47 Am J Juris 123-41, 123
41. Alder (n 8) 718
42. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'Vier Thesen zur Kommunitarismus-Debatte' in Peter Siller and Bertram Keller (eds), Rechtsphilosophische Kontroversen der Gegenwart (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999) 85
43. John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983) 66-67
44. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1980) 113
45. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) 332
46. See Joseph Raz, 'Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries' (1985) 86 Proc Aristot Soc 116-34, 117
47. See also Raz (n 30) 322
48. Joseph Raz, 'Incommensurability and Agency' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 125-27
49. See s 4C
50. Jeremy Waldron, 'Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer' (1994) 45 Hastings L J 814-24, 815
51. See Ronald Dworkin, 'Is There a Right to Pornography?' (1981) 1 OJLS 177-212
52. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA 1971)
53. Waldron also mentions Nozick's concept of side constraints - see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, New York 1974) - which is less important for the goals of my analysis and will therefore not be discussed here
54. See, for instance, Tsakyrakis (n 6)
55. Waldron (n 34) 819
56. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1977) 274-78
57. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York 1993) 294
58. See s 2
59. In the case of 'lexical orderings', the absence of balancing is even clearer, and it is Rawls himself who argues that 'a serial ordering avoids... having to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception' (Rawls, (n 37) 43-emphasis added; see also, Rawls (n 41) 296).
60. This does not mean that this kind of argument cannot be used at all in judicial decisions. What is meant here is only that, whenever an argument based on a trumping relation comes into play, balancing or weighing leaves the stage.
61. Waldron (n 34) 817 (emphasis added)
62. For a detailed analysis of this distinction, see Ruth Chang, 'Introduction' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997)
63. For an analysis of these and other terms like incompossibility, incompatibility, uncomputability, uncertainty, see Brett G Scharffs, 'Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability' (2001) 42Wm & Mary L Rev 1367-435, 1387 ff
64. See Raz (n 31) 117; Raz (n 30) 322
65. Nils Jansen, Die Struktur der Gerechtigkeit (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998) 124
66. Steven Lukes, 'Comparing the Incomparable: Trade-offs and Sacrifices' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 185
67. Richard Warner, 'Does Incommensurability Matter? Incommensurability and Public Policy' (1998) 146 U Pa L Rev 1287-325, 1287
68. Robert Alexy, 'Verfassungsrecht und einfaches Recht - Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarkeit' (2002) 61 VVDStRL 7-33, 218
69. See Lukes (n 47) 188
70. Elizabeth Anderson, 'Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 103-104
71. John Broome, 'Is Incommensurability Vagueness?' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 79
72. Warner (n 47) 1291
73. Nagel (n 25) 131; Sunstein (n 25) 796; Boyle (n 25) 123
74. Aleinikoff (n 5) 945
75. See Chang (n 46)
76. James Griffin, 'Incommensurability: What's the Problem?' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 35
77. W Bradley Wendel, 'Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics' (2000) 78 Wash U L Q 113-213, 144
78. See Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990) 175 ff
79. Bernard Williams, 'Conflict of Values' in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (CUP, Cambridge 1981) 77
80. James Griffin, 'Replies' in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000) 285
81. Gillian K Hadfield, 'An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law' (1998) 146 U Pa L Rev 1235-285, 1259
82. See Aleksander Peczenik, 'Weighing Rights' in Neil MacCormick and Zenon Bankowski (eds), Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy (Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen 1989) 191
83. Raz (n 30) 322; Jansen (n 47) 124
84. Wolfgang Enderlein, Abwägung in Recht und Moral (Karl Alber, Freiburg im Breisgau 1992) 113
85. Although some of these authors do not clearly distinguish incommensurability from incomparability, it is possible to use their definitions as a definition for incomparability
86. See Williams (n 52) 79 ff; Chang (n 46) 5
87. Ruth Chang, 'Comparison and the Justification of Choice' (1998) 146 U Pa L Rev 1569-598, 1575
88. See s 5D
89. Chang (n 54) 1575
90. Virgílio Afonso da Silva, Grundrechte und gesetzgeberische Spielräume (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003) 176
91. See s 6B
92. See David Luban, 'Incommensurable Values, Rational Choice, and Moral Absolutes' (1990) 38 Clev St L Rev 65-84, 78
93. Finnis (n 29)
94. See Lukes (n 47) 188 ff
95. Robert P George, 'Does the "Incommensurability Thesis" Imperil Common Sense Moral Judgments?' (1992) 37 Am J Juris 185-95, 186-87
96. George (n 60) 187. See also Finnis (n 29) 92: 'none (of the basic values) can be analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of any of the others, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit of any of the others'.
97. Lukes, who used the expression 'sacred values' instead of 'basic values', argues: 'To be sacred is to be valued incommensurably' (n 47) 188
98. John Broome, 'Incommensurable Values' in Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker (eds), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000) 22
99. See, for instance, Dieter Grimm, 'Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence' (2007) 57 U Toronto L J 383-97, 393
100. See Luban (n 58) 75 ff
101. Alexy (n 17) 146
102. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 102
103. Alexy, 'Constitutional Rights' (n 15) 136
104. This does not imply that one has to deny the possibility of abstract comparisons at all, or that when balancing principles in a concrete situation their abstract weight never comes into play. For the goals of this article, however, these two issues may be set aside.
105. For the possibility of comparing values in abstract, see Mozaffar Qizilbash, 'Comparability of Values, Rough Equality, and Vagueness: Griffin and Broome on Incommensurability' (2000) 12 Utilitas 223-40, 229
106. For the possibility of including the abstract weight of principles when balancing them in a concrete situation see Alexy (n 4) 441 and 446, especially the inclusion of the abstract weight in his 'weight formula'
107. Luban (n 58) 75
108. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 402
109. Alexy, 'Constitutional Rights' (n 15) 136
110. Robert Alexy, 'Die Gewichtsformel' in Joachim Jickeli and others (eds), Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Sonnenschein (de Gruyter, Berlin 2003) 773
111. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 407-408
112. As Elijah Millgram, 'Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning' in Ruth Chang (ed), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1997) 151 points out, 'commensurability is the result, rather than the precondition, of practical deliberation'
113. David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 169
114. This goal is pointless for two reasons: first, because the statement that mathematical precision is impossible in legal reasoning is a commonplace proposition that nobody denies; and second because defenders of balancing (apart maybe from very naive approaches) do not claim any sort of mathematical precision. It is actually Tsakyrakis himself who repeatedly insists that this is a claim raised by the defenders of balancing. But he is actually the one speaking of 'calculation', of 'the myth of mathematical precision', or that the 'imagery of balancing unavoidably carries with it connotations of mathematical precision' (Tsakyrakis (n 6) 469, 472, 474). Since he does not indicate who raises these claims, it is sometimes difficult to identify which kind of defence of balancing he is arguing against.
115. See for that matter Jerzy Wróblewski, 'Legal Syllogism and Rationality of Judicial Decision' (1974) 5 Rechtstheorie 33-46
116. Grégoire Webber, 'Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship' (2010) 23 Can J L & Juris 179-202, 195-96
117. [2004] SCC 47
118. The decision mentioned provides the following definition of succah: 'A succah is a small enclosed temporary hut or booth, traditionally made of wood or other materials such as fastened canvas, and open to the heavens, in which, it has been acknowledged, Jews are commanded to "dwell" temporarily during the festival of Succot, which commences annually with nightfall on the fifteenth day of the Jewish month of Tishrei. This nine-day festival, which begins in late September or early- to mid-October, commemorates the 40-year period during which, according to Jewish tradition, the Children of Israel wandered in the desert, living in temporary shelters' (Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (n 83) para 5).
119. In another work (Grégoire Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (CUP, Cambridge 2009) 92), Webber classifies the degrees differently, arguing that the interference with the religious precept is moderate and the interference with the principle he calls 'aesthetic harmony' is light. In my analysis, however, I will stick to his latest conclusion (Webber (n 80) 195-96), ie that both interferences are to be classified as light.
120. Webber (n 80) 196
121. Although not explicitly mentioning the concept of horizontal effects, the dissenting opinion by Justice Binnie is informed by this idea (see Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (n 83) para 183 ff.).
122. For an account of this decision as an example of horizontal effects see Pierre-Olivier Laporte, 'La Charte des droits et libertés de la personne et son application dans la sphère contractuelle' (2006) 40 Revue Juridique Thémis 287-351
123. Among the vast literature on the subject, see for instance Daniel Friedmann and Daphne Barak-Erez (eds), Human Rights in Private Law (Hart, Oxford 2003)
124. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998)
125. See Virgílio Afonso da Silva, A constitucionalização do direito: os direitos fundamentais nas relações entre particulares (Malheiros, São Paulo 2005)
126. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 408
127. Alexy (n 4) 443
128. See for instance Webber (n 85) 95
129. See next section
130. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 408, 410
131. Alexy (n 4) 443
132. In other words: in order to declare enacted law unconstitutional, judges must be able to demonstrate that the legislator was completely wrong, ie that either the outcome of the balancing should have been exactly the opposite of what the legislator thought to be the case, or that it was not a stalemate situation. In both cases, judges must be able to demonstrate that there is an answer to this particular case that features a clear large/small (or large/medium or medium/small) trade-off.
133. I speak here of a 'last word' because constitutional courts are usually viewed as having the last word in every constitutional issue. Challenging this assumption is here not necessary and for the sake of argument, this view is simply assumed as a matter of fact.
134. For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Conrado Hübner Mendes, 'Is It All About the Last Word? Deliberative Separation of Powers' (2009) 3 Legisprudence 69-110
135. Conrado Hübner Mendes, 'Not the Last Word, but Dialogue: Deliberative Separation of Powers II' (2009) 3 Legisprudence 191-246
136. See TK Seung and Daniel Bonevac, 'Plural Values and Indeterminate Rankings' (1992) 102 Ethics 799- 813, 802, 805
137. See also da Silva (n 56) 194 ff; Grimm (n 64) 390
138. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 412
139. See John Broome, Weighing Goods (Blackwell, Oxford 1991) 12
140. Broome (n 48) 68
141. John Broome, Weighing Lives (OUP, Oxford 2004) 51
142. Raz (n 32) 120-21; Anderson (n 48) 90; Waldron (n 34) 816; Millgram (n 73) 151
143. Because if C is as good as or worse than B, it has to be as good as or worse than A, since A is exactly as good as B. But C is better than A.
144. Raz (n 32) 120
145. Broome, Weighing Lives (n 99) 166
146. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 402
147. Alexy uses a concrete decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court as an example (BVerfGE 95, 179) concerning the duty to place a health-warning label on tobacco products
148. It is surely controversial whether this is really only a light interference (see Webber (n 85) 94-95), but this is irrelevant to the argument I am putting forward here. The argument would still be valid if one decides that the interference is moderate or serious.
149. One could argue here that the intensity of the protection of the health of individuals increases in the same proportion of the warning's size. But this would be a flawed conclusion, because the reason few people take such warnings seriously (and drink less because of it) is not primarily related to its size, but to its content and to their predisposition to drink irresponsibly. However, in order to avoid misunderstandings, I want to stress that I do not mean that size of such warnings does not matter. It usually matters, sometimes a lot. What I am arguing is something different, namely that such a general warning ('drink responsibly') hardly becomes more effective merely by increasing its size.
150. Even though without using the vocabulary of transitivity, the objection of irrationality is a common one against weighing rights and against the theory of principles (see for instance Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1992)
151. Friedrich Müller, Strukturierende Rechtslehre (2nd edn, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1994)
152. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 'Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen: Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Grundrechtsdogmatik' in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde (ed), Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie: Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1991)
153. Bernhard Schlink, 'Freiheit durch Eingriffsabwehr - Rekonstruktion der klassischen Grundrechtsfunktion' (1984) 11 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 457-68
154. Although it is not my goal here to refute these specific objections, I do think that the arguments used throughout in the article against the incomparability between values or rights could fulfil at least a part of this task
155. Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 412
156. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (2nd edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986) 431
157. Griffin (n 2) 80
158. Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (OUP, New York 1993) 87
159. Qizilbash (n 67)
160. George Harris, 'Value Vagueness, Zones of Incomparability, and Tragedy' (2001) 38 Am Phil Q 155-76, 155
161. Ruth Chang, 'The Possibility of Parity' (2002) 112 Ethics 659-88, 661
162. See also Ruth Chang, 'Parity, Interval Value, and Choice' (2005) 115 Ethics 331-50, 331 ff
163. For Chang, the concept of rough equality and that of parity are not exactly the same. For the purpose of this article, however, it is not necessary to make further distinctions between them.
164. See Seung and Bonevac (n 97) 802
165. Griffin (n 2) 81; Seung and Bonevac (n 97) 802
166. See Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law (OUP, Oxford 2000) 41 ff
167. Ashley Piggins and Maurice Salles, 'Instances of Indeterminacy' (2007) 29 Analyse & Kritik 311-28, 317 ff
168. Especially because it is argued that if roughness is only epistemic, then rough equality (or parity) cannot be considered a fourth relation between two values, since it would still hold that either A is (at least a little) better than B, or A is (at least a little) worse than B, or A is (exactly) as good as B, even though we cannot detect precisely which one of these three relations is true. For a thorough account of this debate, see Broome (n 48), Griffin (n 51); Chang (n 46) and Qizilbash (n 67).
169. For an ontological account of vagueness see, for instance, Dominic Hyde, Vagueness, Logic and Ontology (Ashgate, Aldershot 2008)
170. See the end of s 5B and s 5C
171. See s 5B
172. See s 5
173. Evans v UK (2008) 46 EHRR 34, paras 13-14
174. See Bomhoff and Zucca (n 5) 430
175. See also Steven Greer, ' "Balancing" and the European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate' (2004) 63 CLJ 412-34, 418, 423
176. Bomhoff and Zucca (n 5) 429
177. Greer (n 124) 423
178. See section 5
179. See Luban (n 58) 78-79
180. See also Seung and Bonevac (n 97) 802
181. See also Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 411: 'If the reason for the interference is just as strong as the reason against it, the interference is not disproportionate'
182. This is only a general approach to the problem and is not sufficient to provide an answer for all cases. This is why Alexy supplemented it with the 'law of diminishing marginal utility' (Alexy (n 17) 147; Alexy, A Theory (n 15) 103).
183. Here again one could find similarities between Alexy's idea and certain concepts from the debate on comparability. Stocker, for instance, argues that certain balancing cannot be performed 'by a simple hinged beam balance or a sliding beam balance', because 'differing amounts of a given element can have the same effect depending on their location'. To illustrate this, he suggests the idea of a 'pan suspended on a cord through its centre' or 'a sphere or a still higher-dimensioned object suspended at its centre' (Stocker (n 52) 148). Although this idea cannot be further developed here, it must be taken into account whenever one argues that the degree of satisfaction of one principle is 'on a par' with the degree of restriction of another principle. A small example may illustrate this. A moderate degree of industrial development is not 'on a par' with a moderate degree of environmental degradation in a country where industrial development is already very advanced and where the environment has already been submitted to considerable devastation. Placing both on a hinged beam balance would surely not provide an adequate result for the balancing operation.
184. Evans v UK (n 120) [91] (emphasis added)
185. Regan (n 1) 137-138