From expert administration to accountability network: A new paradigm for comparative administrative law

American Journal of Comparative Law

Volumn 59, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 859-907

  Bignami, Francesca ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866455684     PISSN: 0002919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5131/AJCL.2010.0031     Document Type: Article

References (130)

1. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997);
2. Adrienne Héritier & Martin Rhodes, New Modes of Governance, in NEW MODES OF GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 163 (Adrienne Héritier & Martin Rhodes eds., 2011);
3. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
4. See, e.g., AGENCIES IN COMPARATIVE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (LUC Verhey & Tom Zwart eds., 2003);
5. COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010);
6. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION? (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2009).
7. PIERRE ROSANVALLON, LA LÉGITIMITÉ DÉMOCRATIQUE: IMPARTIALITÉ, RÉFLEXIVITÉ, PROXIMITÉ 59-99 (2008).
8. HUGH STUART JONES, THE FRENCH STATE IN QUESTION: PUBLIC LAW AND POLTTICAL ARGUMENT IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC 60-195 (1993).
9. FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 85 (1914).
10. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 48-209 (1982).
11. See LUCA MANNORI & BERNARDO SORDI, STORIA DEL DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 376 (2001);
12. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY, 1800-1914, 402 (2001). Although this section is limited to the United States, Germany, and France, it should be noted that Italian administrative law was heavily influenced by German doctrinal writing; the Pandectist method, with its focus on administrative acts, was also emblematic of Italian scholarship.
13. See Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, Administrative Law in Italy: An Historical Sketch, RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 1009 (2010).
14. OTTO MAYER, I LE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF ALLEMAND: PARTIE GÉNÉRALE KParis, V. Giard & E. Brière (1903).
15. FRANK J. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY (1893).
16. ERNST FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928).
17. For a discussion of Freund's scholarship, see John Reitz, The Influence of Ernst Freund on American Law, in DER EINFLUSS DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 423 (Marcus Lutte et al. eds., 1993).
18. MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF ET DE DROIT PUBLIC GÉNÉRAL (3d ed. Paris, L. Larose 1897).
19. Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 440-44 (2003);
20. EZRA SULEIMAN, DISMANTLING DEMOCRATIC STATES (2003).
21. See, e.g., Marc Allen Eisner, Corporate Environmentalism, Regulatory Reform, and Industry Self-Regulation, 17 GOVERNANCE 145 (2004).
22. See, e.g., ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES (2004).
23. See, e.g., SABINO CASSESE, IL DIRITTO GLOBALE (2009).
24. Robert E. Goodin et al., The Public and Its Policies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 3 (Michael Moran et al. eds., 2006);
25. R.A.W. Rhodes, Policy Network Analysis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY 425, supra;
26. Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning From Difference, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010).
27. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009).
28. See, e.g., LEGAL CHALLENGES IN EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Herwig C.H. Hofman & Alexander H. Turk eds., 2009).
29. See, e.g., AGENCIES IN COMPARATIVE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 2;
30. COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2;
31. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION?, supra note 2.
32. See Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similiarties or Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 383, 407 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2008).
33. John S. Bell, Comparative Administrative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, id., 1259, 1261.
34. JACQUES ZILLER, ADMINISTRATIONS COMPARÉES: LES SYSTEMS POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIFS DE l'EUROPE DES DOUZE 270-71 (1993).
35. MICHEL FROMONT, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF DES ÉTATS EUROPÉENS (2006).
36. See generally Michael D. Ward et al., Network Analysis and Political Science, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 245, 248-49 (2011);
37. Emilie Hafher-Burton et al., Network Analysis for International Relations, 63 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 559 (2009). This article engages in what Ward et al. calls a "qualitative and analogical analysis of networks" and what Hafner-Burton et al. refer to as the study of the "network form of Organization."
38. On the history and development of the civil service in the United States, see SKOWRONEK, supra note 6. On the history of the civil service in Europe, see CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE (Hans A.G.M. Bekke & Frits M. van der Meer eds., 2000);.
39. See Lorenzo Saltari, Formazione e selezione dei dirigenti pubblici nell'ordinamento statale, negli ordinamenti regionali e negli altri stati, in LA DIRIGENZA DELLO STATO ED IL RUOLO DELLA SCUOLA SuPERIOKE DI PUBBLICA AMMINIS-TRAZIONE 29 (Bernardo G. Mattarella ed., 2009), available at http://www.sspa.it.
40. See Richard Rose, Giving Direction to Government in Comparative Perspective, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 72 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark A. Peterson eds., 2005);
41. Barbara Nunberg, Ready for Europe: Public Administration Reform and European Union Accession in Central and Eastern Europe, World Bank Technical Paper No. 466, at 40 (2000).
42. See Stefano Battini, Il Personale, in IL SISTEMA AMMINISTRATIVO ITALIANO 279 (Luisa Torchia ed., 2009);
43. Sabino Cassese, Hypotheses on the Italian Administrative System, 16 WEST EUROPEAN POL. 325 (1993).
44. See Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and 'Public Values', in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 511.
45. See GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
46. In the legal literature, this has been called the "transmission- belt" theory of administration. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). In the political science literature it is known as the "principal-agent" theory of administration.
47. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999);
48. Kaare Strom, Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation, in DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 55-106 (Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang Müller & Torbjörn Bergman eds., 2003).
49. See Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE L.J. 1341 (2004).
50. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).
51. MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREV, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 19 (1992).
52. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007);
53. Keith E. Whittingon & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American Institutional Development, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 495 (2003).
54. See FABRIZIO GILARDI, DELEGATION IN THE REGULATORY STATE: INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE (2008).
55. See Jens-Peter Schneider, Regulation and Europeanisation as Key Patterns of Change in Administrative Law, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN EUROPE 309 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2007);
56. see generally Dominque Custos, Independent Administrative Authorities in France, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 277, 280;
57. Daniel Halberstam, The Promise of Comparative Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 185, 195-99.
58. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
59. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 76-102 (6th ed. 2006).
60. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (2001).
61. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999).
62. See Terry Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government, 150 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 171 (1994).
63. See MICHEL PRIEUR, DROIT DE l'ENVIRONNMENT (5th ed. 2004) (France); Lei 9.985/2000 (Brazil);
64. CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 573-74, 582-88 (3d ed. 2009) (England);
65. Gabriella Pavon & Jose Juan Gonzalez, Land Use Planning in Mexico, in LAND USE LAW FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 484-502 (Nathalie J. Chalifour et al. eds., 2007);
66. Aldo Sandulli, Il Procedimento, in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 1035-1342 (Sabino Cassese et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (Italy);
67. Ho CHIN SIONG, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE CITY PLANNING 65 (2003).
68. See, e.g., DEBORAH L RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 113-29 (5th ed. 2009) (United States);
69. JOËL MORET-BAILLY, LES DÉONTOLOGIES 102-10 (2001) (France);
70. Maria da Gloria Bonelli, Lawyers' Associations and the Brazilian State, 1843-1997, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1045 (2003).
71. Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in TRENDS TOWARD CORPORATIST INTERMEDIATION 13, 15, 27-28 (Philippe C. Schmitter & Gerhard Lehmbruch eds., 1979);
72. Gerhard Lehmbruch, Introduction, in PATTERNS OF CORPORATIST POLICY-MAKING 1, 16-23 (Gerhard Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1982);
73. Wolfgang Streeck, The Study of Organized Interests, in THE DIVERSITY OF DEMOCRACY 3, 17-18, 29-30 (Colin Crouch & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2006).
74. See Graham K. Wilson, Why is There No Corporatism in the United States? in PATTERNS OF CORPORATIST POLICY-MAKING 219, 232 (Gerhard Lehhbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1982).
75. This literature is far too vast to canvass here. For an excellent introduction to this strand of French intellectual history, see J.E.S. Hayward, Solidarist Syndicalism, 8 SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 17 (1960).
76. See Daniel J. Tichenor & Richard A. Harris, The Development of Interest Group Politics in America, 8 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 251, 251-52 (2005).
77. There have been attempts to devise alternatives to notice-and-comment rulemaking, which has been criticized as conflictuel and time-consuming, but they have had only limited success. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, Collaboration, J. DISP. RESOL. 411, 440-41 (2009).
78. See, e.g., JEAN CALAIS-AULOY & FRANK STEINMETZ, DROIT DE LA CONSOMMATION 26-27 (5th ed. 2000);
79. Sabino Cassese, Amministrazione pubblica e interessi in Italia, DIRITTO E SOCIETÀ 223 (1992);
80. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 65-66 (1995);
81. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, FROM ELECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY: BUILDING ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY AND POLAND 131,185, 203 (2005). Perhaps the paradigmatic example of neo-corporatist interest representation is the institution of the Social and Economic Council. This institution exists in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and the European Union, and is tasked with advising the government and parliament on legislative initiatives.
82. See J.E.S. HAYWARD, PRIVATE INTERESTS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1966). Today, however, most agree that their influence over lawmaking is minimal, whereas the policy-specific committees discussed in the text continue to serve an important fact-finding and advisory function.
83. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Participation in Governance from a Comparative Perspective, J. DISP. RESOL. 381 (2009).
84. See JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUX, DROIT DE LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE (14th ed. 2001).
85. See MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY (4th ed. 2008).
86. See R.B. ANDEWEG & GALEN A. IRWIN, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF THE NETHERLANDS 145 (2002);
87. JELLE VISSER & ANTON HEMERIJCK, A DUTCH MIRACLE 169, 172 (1997).
88. Danish Environmental Protection Act, Chapter 12.
89. See MORET-BAILLY, supra note 59. In the political science literature, many do not consider France to be a neo-corporatist system because labor and employer groups are poorly organized and because of the hostility of republican theory to particularistic interests. However, the mixing of public and private powers that is characteristic of neo-corporatism is present in the French case too. See John T. S. Keeler, Corporatism and Official Union Hegemony, in ORGANIZING INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE 185 (Suzanne Berger ed., 1981).
90. Moreover, as Pierre Rosanvallon has pointed out, the institutional practice of French democracy creates significant space for organized interests and therefore the standard republican image of French politics is highly misleading. The law and practice of French administrative governance is a good illustration of the mismatch between what Rosanvallon calls "the representation and the reality." PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERTY 3 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2007).
91. See JIM SWEENEY, EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE CHAMBERS IN GERMAN SPEAKING COUNTRIES (1996).
92. See, e.g., Jörg Pinsinger, Doctors, in REGULATION OF PROFESSIONS 377, 389, 391, 392 (Michael Faure et al. eds., 1993) (demonstrating that in the United States the medical profession enjoys fewer self-regulatory powers than in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).
93. See Walter Mattli & Tim Buthe, Setting International Standards, 56 WORLD POLITICS 1, 23-25 (2003).
94. See JOSEF FALKE, 3 RECHTUCHE ASPEKTE DER NORMUNG IN DEN EG-MITGLIEDSTAATEN: DEUTSCHLAND 22, 183 (2000);
95. HARM SCHEPEL & JOSEF FALKE, 1 LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EC AND EFTA: COMPARATIVE REPORT 76 (2000).
96. See, e.g., J.W.F. ALLISON, A CONTINENTAL DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW (2003);
97. Sabino Cassese, La costruzione del diritto amministrativo, in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 1-93 (Sabino Cassese, ed., 2d ed. 2003);
98. MARCO d'ALBERTI, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO COMPARATO (1992); MANNORI & SORDI, supra note 7, at 85-86;
99. J.D.B. Mitchell, The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law in England, PUBLIC LAW 95, 96-101 (1965).
100. See THOMAS EHTMAN, BIRTH OF THE LEVIATHAN 158-66 (1997).
101. See COLIN RHYS LOVELL, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 207-452 (1962).
102. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1885).
103. Unlike members of the judiciary, members of the Council of State do not enjoy a formal guarantee of permanence in office (inamovibilitÉ), meaning that, in theory, they can be transferred from one post to another for any reason, not only in the case of disciplinary sanctions. In practice, however, the government never uses these powers and it would be unthinkable for it to do so. There are also various other legal guarantees that ensure independence. See Jean Massot, The Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 415, 416-17.
104. See generally ELIZABETH ZOLLER, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 250-60 (2008).
105. See Etienne Picard, The Public-Private Divide m French Law Through the History and Destiny of French Administrative Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION?, supra note 2, at 17, 79.
106. See Jacques Petit, A Reappraisal of the Distinction Between Administrative Contracts and Private Legal Contracts in French Law, in THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE LAW DIVIDE: POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION?, supra note 2, at 283.
107. Kenneth F. Ledford, Formalizing the Rule of Law in Prussia, 37 CENTRAL EUROPEAN HISTORY 203 (2004).
108. Yves Gaudemet, L'exportation du droit administratif français, in MÉLANGES PHILIPPE ARDANT 431, 438 (1999).
109. See ALAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, ETUDES DE DROIT PUBLIC COMPARÉ (2001).
110. See Tom Ginsburg, Dismantling the "Developmental State" 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (2001).
111. See Peter Cane, Judicial Review in the Age of Tribunals, PUBLIC LAW 479 (2009).
112. PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5-18, 531-49 (6th ed. 2008).
113. For this discussion of constitutional principles in German administrative law, see George Nolte, General Principles of German and European Administrative Law 57 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 191 (1994).
114. See Edward J. Eberle, The West German Administrative Procedure Act, 3 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 67 (1984).
115. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
116. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A).
117. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, Lord Diplock.
118. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
119. See BENGT WIESLANDER, THE PARLIAMENTARY OMBUDSMAN IN SWEDEN 11-16 (1994) (ombudsman);
120. Donald C. Rowat, Rapport General, in LE SECRET ADMINISTRATIF DANS LES PAYS DÉVELOPPÉS 21, 27-29 (1977) (access to documents).
121. Early accounts include WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966)
122. and DONALD ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN (1968).
123. A good example of the more recent literature is KATYA HEEDE, EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN (2000).
124. For an overview of a number of similar government bodies, see John M. Ackerman, Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 265.
125. See, e.g., The European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behavior, art. 12.
126. See John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 85 (2006).
127. For a complete list of European ombudsmen, see The European Network of Ombudsmen, http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/atyourservice/nationalombudsmen.faces.
128. PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL (DAVID BANISAR), FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD 2006: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION LAWS (2006).
129. See EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY (John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998).
130. Cf. Mariana Mota Prado, Presidential Dominance from a Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 225.