Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: A comparison

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 293-304

  Harnay, Sophie ^a   Marciano, Alain ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

^b UNIV MONTPELLIER   (France)

Author keywords

Class action; Collective litigation; Free rider problem; Political market; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052262858     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9242-y     Document Type: Article

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