Minimalism and experimentalism in the administrative State

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53-93

  Sabel, Charles F ^a   Simon, William H ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 83755178971     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (93)

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2. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) , for an analysis of the relation of bureaucracy and adjudication in a key welfare program. We focus on the parallels among Sunstein, Ackerman, and Mashaw in their treatment of administrative policy implementation. In the sphere of constitutional adjudication, Ackerman rejects Sunstein's minimalism.
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70. See generally William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, at 37,44-55.
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89. Charles Sabel, Self-Discovery as a Coordination Problem 10-11 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
90. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, & THE NEW SOCIAL POUCY (2001) (examining the institutional configuration of Community Economic Development practice).
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