The limits of procedural private ordering

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 723-799

  Dodge, Jaime ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961212219     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (231)

1. See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928)
2. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874)
3. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 579, 612 (2007)
4. Chris W. Sanchirico & George Triantis, Evidentiary Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance, 24 J.L. Econ. & Org. 72, 72-73 (2008)
5. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167, 200-04 (2004).
6. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994)
7. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 427-30 (2006)
8. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 984, 990 (2008).
9. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387, 388-89 (1992)
10. G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 431, 452-62 (1993)
11. Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 Yale L.J. 1935, 1940-41 (1991)
12. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1422 (2008)
13. Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103, 154-55 (2006)
14. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605, 665-67 (2010)
15. David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1949, 1980-81 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 461, 462 (2007)
17. Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 514, 518 (2009)
18. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 856-78 (2006)
19. Meredith R. Miller, Contracting Out of Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability: An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 365, 367-70 (2008)
20. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 593, 622-27 (2005)
21. David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1085, 1085-87 (2002).
22. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 2 (Dec. 31, 2008)
23. 15, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Securities Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1450 (1983);
24. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-17 & n.15 (1972)
25. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991)
26. cf. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1919, 1921, 1926-29 (2009)
27. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 287-88, 296-97 (2002)
28. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)
29. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)
30. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010)
31. Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427
32. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468
33. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.).
34. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 213-14
35. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874);
36. see also Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 600 (1997)
37. Morse, 87 U.S. at 451.
38. For historical development, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)
39. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972).
40. See Nat'l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964).
41. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975)
42. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1972)
43. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972).
44. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13
45. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 95-96
46. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 186
47. Carnival Cruise Lines 499 U.S. at 595-96
48. see also Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tex. Int'l L.J. 323, 358 (1992)
49. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int'l L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992).
50. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 1998)
51. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1998)
52. Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996)
53. Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993)
54. Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)
56. accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009)
57. Vimar Seguros 515 U.S. at 540.
58. See, e.g., PacifiCare Health Sys. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003)
59. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000)
60. Vimar Seguros 515 U.S. at 531-32 541
61. S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
62. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)
63. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1972)
64. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975))
65. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184-86 (1972).
66. Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts 15:12, at 264-67 (4th ed. 1997).
67. Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. Fed. 688, 691 (2003)
68. But see United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 & n.5 (1995)
69. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208
70. Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1803, 1812 (1997)
71. AT&T v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011)
72. Hall Street Associates, 552 U.S. at 592.
73. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010).
74. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
75. Chris William Sanchirico, A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens, 37 J. Legal Stud. 273, 273 (2008)
76. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1593, 1612-14 (2008)
77. Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1965)
78. see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842)
79. In passing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (2005)
80. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1629, 1629 (2008)
81. cf. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant's Obligation to Ensure Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 511, 529 & n.111 (2006)
82. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010)
83. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
84. see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 581, 593 (1998)
85. Andrew R. Sebok, International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice: What Has Become of Our World?, 24 Tort & Ins. L.J. 390, 392 (1989)
86. Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1793, 1804 n.53 (2009).
87. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991)
88. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975, 1981 (2006)
89. see also Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151, 1152-53 (2000).
90. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1475, 1475-76 (2009).
91. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1443, 1452 (1992)
92. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 518, 552 2004).
93. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 410-412 (2005)
94. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1151, 1174-75 (2009)
95. See, e.g., Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 3-5 (2009)
96. Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1383-84 (2008)
97. Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2073, 2073-74 (2009)
98. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 70C-3-104, 70C-4-105 (2009)
99. N.M. Stat. §§ 44-7A-1(b)(4)(f), 44-7A-5 (2010)
100. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight From Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 335, 343-44, 358-59 (2007)
101. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
102. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972)
103. Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 2005, at 52 (3d ed. 2010).
104. see Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. Legal Stud. 503, 504-09, 523-25 (2008)
105. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150, 150-63 (1995)
106. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & Econ. 1, 1-15 (1994)
107. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187-88 (1972)
108. See, e.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
109. Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010)
110. See Edward Brunet et al., Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment 131 (2006).
111. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
112. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 884-86 (2008)
113. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008)
114. See Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359-60 (Utah 1996).
115. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 101-02 (1989)
116. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1615, 1620-23 (1999).
117. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008)
118. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157, 179 (2006).
119. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 954 (2000).
120. Cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 287-88, 295-97 (2002)
121. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
122. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Mandatory Arbitration for Customers but Not for Peers: A Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-Consumer Contracts, 92 Judicature 118 (2008)
123. Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381, 1394-96 (2009)
124. See, e.g., Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 819
125. Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 181, 181 (2006)
126. Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for Employers Over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 Def. Couns. J. 91, 96 (2009)
127. see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 779 (2002)
128. Cf. Kerobo v. Sw. Clean Fuels, Corp., 285 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2002)
129. see Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2-3 (1995).
130. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. 4 (2009)
131. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1203 (2003)
132. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529 (1971)
133. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. Legal Stud. 309, 333 (2009)
134. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 585.
135. 137Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 583, 585 (1990)
136. Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (2002)).
137. See generally Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 747, 773-74 (2009)
138. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 746-47, 753-54 (2008)
139. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 715-35 (1999)
140. Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. Experimental Psychol. 551, 551 (1978)
141. See generally Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition 215 (2d ed. 1991)
142. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1091 (2000)
143. see Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75, 96-99 (2004).
144. The Economics of U.S. Tort Liability: A Primer 20 (2003).
145. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 637-38 (1979)
146. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (2008)
147. see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 643-93 (1999)
148. see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420, 1425 (1999)
149. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1473 (1998).
150. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
151. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991).
152. See Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 451, 464-75 (2008).
153. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976)
154. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970)
155. Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 485, 487-93 (2003)
156. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 698 (1980)
157. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 382 (1978).
158. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 273-312 (2004).
159. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 580 (1984)
160. See generally U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)
161. Compare Stephen C. Yeazell, Civil Procedure 138 (7th ed. 2008)
162. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (waiver of notice)
163. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (consent to late amendment)
164. Fed. R. Civ. P. 29 (stipulation of deposition and discovery procedures)
165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (stipulations regarding deposition testimony)
166. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (stipulation of the number of interrogatories)
167. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (jury trial waiver).
168. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (settlement of class action)
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 29(b) (discovery extensions that modify court deadlines)
170. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B) (deposition of incarcerated deponent).
171. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988)
172. Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir. 1993)
173. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d).
174. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 831, 852 (2002)
175. see Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1301, 1349-62 (2008).
176. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 Judicature 161, 163 (1986)
177. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631, 638 (1994)
178. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995)
179. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 & n.19 (1985).
180. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1991).
181. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1916-19 (2002).
182. See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998)
183. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)
184. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)
185. see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989)
186. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106 (2002).
187. see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 913, 914 & n.2 (1998).
188. Michael S. Wogalter et al., Risk Perception of Common Consumer Products: Judgments of Accident Frequency and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. Safety Res. 97, 100 (1993).
189. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1442 (2010).
190. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 747 (2003)
191. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011)
192. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991).
193. Cf. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1227-28 (1983)
194. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 99 (2009)
195. See In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2009)
196. See, e.g., Azizian v. Federated Dep't Stores, 243 F. App'x 311, 312-13 (9th Cir. 2007)
197. Wilkinson v. Federated Dep't Stores, No. 05-15847 (9th Cir. May 25, 2006), 2006 WL 3014493)
198. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2004)
199. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1355 (1995)
200. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 4.28, at 315-16 (3d ed. 1999).
201. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 796 n.118 (2002) (citing cases).
202. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (opt-out).
203. see also, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (2006) (opt-in).
204. See David M. Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure, 51 Law & Contemp. Probs. 111, 115 (1988).
205. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
206. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
207. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010).
208. S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 1945.
209. Cf. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 430 (1996)
210. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
211. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974)
212. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972)
213. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188-89 (1972).
214. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509, 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1998)
215. Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1228, 1230-31 (6th Cir. 1995).
216. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993)
217. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 954, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1992).
218. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1069-71 (11th Cir. 1987).
219. Exceptional Urgent Care Center v. Protomed Med., No. 5:08-CV- 284, 2009 WL 2151181, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2009).
220. Pods, Inc. v. Paysource, Inc., No. 8:05-CV-1764, 2006 WL 1382099, at 1, 4 (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2006).
221. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2328-29 (2001).
222. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 75-76 (2006).
223. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 46 (1984).
224. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517.
225. Cf. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 212.
226. See generally John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1162, 1168 (2007).
227. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1541-47 (1998).
228. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991).
229. see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1227-28 (1983).
230. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1991) (quoting 46 U.S.C. App. 183c (1988)).
231. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010).