Carrots, sticks, and the multiplication effect

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 365-384

  Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe ^a   Geest, Gerrit De ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953825919     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewn026     Document Type: Article

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