The simple economics of class action: Private provision of club and public goods

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 205-224

  Cassone, Alberto ^a   Ramello, Giovanni B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN PIEDMONT   (Italy)

Author keywords

Class action; Club; Collective litigation; Deterrence; Liability; Mass tort

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052229426     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-011-9254-7     Document Type: Article

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