Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 41, Issue , 2011, Pages 25-67

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LINEAR ORDER; MAXIMIN; PARTIAL ORDER; POSITIONAL SCORING RULES; SUB-PROBLEMS; VOTING RULES;

EID: 80053394701     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.3186     Document Type: Article

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