Copeland voting: Ties matter

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 965-972

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Schnoor, Henning ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Multiagent systems; Preferences

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

COMPLEXITY RESULTS; ELECTION SYSTEMS; NP COMPLETE; PREFERENCES;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84890874785     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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