Possible winners when new candidates are added: The case of scoring rules

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 2, Issue , 2010, Pages 762-767

  Chevaleyre, Yann ^a   Lang, Jérôme ^a   Maudet, Nicolas ^a   Monnot, Jérôme ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLEXITY RESULTS; FIXED NUMBERS; POSSIBLE WINNER PROBLEMS; SCORING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 77958589497     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (16)

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