Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 35, Issue , 2009, Pages 161-191

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGGREGATES;

AGENT'S PREFERENCES; AGGREGATE RANKING; GENERAL METHOD; MULTIPLE AGENTS; PREFERENCE ELICITATION; SUBLINEAR;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 68349084609     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2606     Document Type: Article

References (41)

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