A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 53-58

  Betzler, Nadja ^a   Hemmann, Susanne ^a   Niedermeier, Rolf ^a  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS; FIXED-PARAMETER TRACTABILITY; FLUENCES; NP COMPLETE; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POSITIONAL SCORING RULES; POSSIBLE WINNER PROBLEMS; VOTING RULES;

MULTIVARIANT ANALYSIS;

EID: 78751700282     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (11)

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