Manipulation of copeland elections

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 1, Issue , 2010, Pages 367-374

  Faliszewski, Piotr ^a   Hemaspaandra, Edith ^b   Schnoor, Henning ^c  

^a AGH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

^b ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF KIEL   (Germany)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Multiagent systems; Preferences

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

COALITIONAL MANIPULATIONS; ELECTION SYSTEMS; PREFERENCES;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 79956372644     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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