Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 304-324

  Lang, Jérôme ^a   Xia, Lirong ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DAUPHINE   (France)

^b Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

CP networks; Multiple elections; Preferential independence; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 61549138418     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.010     Document Type: Article

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