Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 173, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 392-412

  Zuckerman, Michael ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b MICROSOFT   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational complexity; Computational social choice; Manipulation; Voting

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL HARDNESSES; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE; EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS; MANIPULATION; MAXIMIN; VOTING; VOTING RULES;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY;

EID: 57749118587     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.005     Document Type: Article

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