Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2008, Pages 196-201

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGENTS; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; BIONICS;

HARDNESS RESULTS; LINEAR ORDERS; MAXIMIN; PARTIAL ORDERS; SCORING RULES; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS; TIME ALGORITHMS; VOTING RULES;

THEOREM PROVING;

EID: 57749173631     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

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