A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 275-284

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Procaccia, Ariel D ^b  

^a Duke University   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

coalitional manipulation; positional scoring rules; scheduling; social choice

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL PROBLEMS; COALITIONAL MANIPULATION; INTEGRALITY GAPS; NP COMPLETE; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; ROUNDING PROCEDURES; SCHEDULING PROBLEM; SCORING RULES; SOCIAL CHOICE; VOTING RULES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 77954733559     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807386     Document Type: Conference Paper

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