Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules

Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Volumn 76, Issue 8, 2010, Pages 812-836

  Betzler, Nadja ^a   Dorn, Britta ^b  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Incomplete information; k approval; NP hardness; Partial votes; Voting systems

Indexed keywords

NP-HARD; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; NP-HARDNESS RESULTS; PARTIAL VOTES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POSSIBLE WINNER PROBLEMS; SCORING VECTORS; VOTING PROTOCOLS; VOTING SYSTEMS;

HARDNESS;

EID: 78650862763     PISSN: 00220000     EISSN: 10902724     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcss.2010.04.002     Document Type: Article

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