Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 348-353

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Zuckerman, Michael ^b   Procaccia, Ariel D ^c   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^b  

^a Duke University   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

COALITIONAL MANIPULATIONS; COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICES; HARDNESS OF APPROXIMATION; MAXIMIN; NP COMPLETE; VOTING RULES;

MANIPULATORS;

EID: 78751683337     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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