Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2007, Pages 776-781

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Lang, Jérôme ^b   Ying, Mingsheng ^a  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PAUL SABATIER   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; DOMAIN DECOMPOSITION METHODS; KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS;

SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITION; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 36349024343     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (5)

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2. Brams, S.; Kilgour, D. M.; and Zwicker, W. 1998. The paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and Welfare 15:211-236.
3. Lacy, D., and Niou, E. 2000. A problem with referendums. J. of Theoretical Politics 12(1):5-31.
4. Lang, J. 2007. Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences. In Proc. of the Twentieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
5. Xia, L.; Lang, J.; and Ying, M. 2007. Multiple elections paradoxes and sequential voting rules. In Proceedings of TARK-2007.